THE INFLUENCE OF RECRUITMENT AND TEAMS ON COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE BEHAVIOURS: AN AUSTRALIAN CASE STUDY

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ABSTRACT

This paper draws on a broad range of theoretical perspectives to frame counter-productive behaviours in an Australian case study. The organisation, *FoodWorks* is a greenfield site that made a concerted effort throughout the development process to advance a selection process and a semi-autonomous work team (SAWT) environment that facilitated a high level of organisational citizenship behaviours. However, the start-up goals were not met. Furthermore, low wages increased the employee's inclination to engage in counter-productive behaviours.

Keywords: Counter-productive behaviours, recruitment, teams, food-processing, wage-effort bargain.

INTRODUCTION

Since the early 1990s the field of organisational behaviour has given an increased level of attention to 'counter-productive' behaviours in the workplace (Bies and Tripp 1996; 1998; Matinko, Gundlach and Douglas 2002). However, such employee actions have been investigated in the fields of industrial sociology/industrial relations (Beynon 1973; Burawoy 1979; Edwards and Scullion 1982; Knights and McCabe 2000; Roy 1952; 1954), criminology (Ditton 1976; 1977; 1979), anthropology (Mars 1973; 1974; 1982) for many decades. There is a wide range of terms that are used throughout the various disciplines to refer to such employee behaviours – conflict, resistance, misbehaviour to name just a few. However, this paper maintains consistency with the theme of this special edition by referring to all such actions as 'counter-productive' behaviours (CPBs).

This paper draws on a broad range of theoretical perspectives to frame CPBs in an Australian case study. The organisation, *FoodWorks* is a greenfield site that made a concerted effort throughout the development process to advance a selection process and a semi-autonomous work team (SAWT) environment that facilitated a high level of organisational citizenship behaviours (OCBs) (see Organ 1988). Furthermore, the selection process and team environment was intended to eliminate the likelihood of CPBs. This paper explores the development and existence of these two inter-related issues, employee selection and the organisation of work, and suggests that in this case, the organisation has had a moderate level of success in achieving their goals. Furthermore, this paper provides an explanation of why this organisation has achieved only a moderate level of success.

The remainder of this paper is divided into five sections. The first section explores the notion of CPBs from a range of disciplinary perspectives. The second section of this paper will provide some contextual information of the case study organisation, as well as a

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methodological explanation of this study. Thirdly, this paper will examine the selection process of the FoodWorks plant. This will be followed by a consideration of the development and role of the semi-autonomous teams at FoodWorks. Finally, a discussion integrates the findings in relation to CPBs in this case and provides some explanations.

COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE BEHAVIOURS—A BROAD VIEW

The study of counter-productive behaviours of employees in the workplace has a long history. This history has shown Frederick Winslow Taylor to be one of the most influential of managerial theorists. Much of his work had a dual focus; firstly, the search for efficiency through finding the 'one best way' to perform tasks, and secondly, eliminating what we now refer to as CPBs. Taylor felt that 'soldiering' or 'underworking' was one of the greatest evils that gripped the working man (Taylor 1911). An interesting proposition for the time, but it could be easily argued that there are many greater 'evils' in today's workplace.

There is a wealth of industrial sociology throughout the post-World War II period that delves into why employees engage in such behaviours (see for examples: Beynon and Blackburn 1972; Blauner 1964; Cunnison 1966; Lupton 1963; Roy 1952; 1954; Woodward 1965). A range of interesting propositions came from this body of work. For example, it was recognised that non-work factors influence employee behaviours in the workplace. In addition, this body of industrial sociology recognised that many employee behaviours that were outside the formal rule structure were focussed on benefiting the organisation despite negative implications for the employees. An important theoretical assumption framing this research was the acknowledgement of the pluralistic nature of the employment relationship. That is to say, that the goals of an employee and the goals of an employer have some commonalities, but will never be aligned.

In recent years there has been a growing research focus and theoretical development of the notion of CPBs in the field of organisation behaviour. Numerous researchers have investigated particular behaviours, while others have attempted to incorporate a range of behaviours for more integrative theoretical developments. CPBs have been defined to include actions such as rule-breaking and day-dreaming while on the job, through to theft and sabotage (Ones, Viswesvaran and Schmidt 1993). Collins and Griffin (1998) make the point that despite the various nuances, all the definitions are characterised by a disregard for societal and organisational rules and values. However, there are problems with these approaches. There is an implied assumption that the employee has intent to perform damage, and also has control over the outcome of their particular actions. This leaves little room for unintended consequences of behaviours that might not begin with the intention of being counter-productive.

Furthermore, the unitarist assumption that presupposes that what is good for the organisation is good for the employee remains problematic. Certainly, a successful organisation is good for those employees who wish to maintain their employment. However, the employment relationship is a complex web of legal rules, institutional practices and policies, and informal actions. Given this complexity as a starting assumption, it is reasonable to acknowledge that some of this web of complexity can have oppositional outcomes for the employee and the employer.

Hence, the implicit assumption in much of the CPB research that the management of the organisation is 'doing the right thing' and it is the employees' response that is the 'counter-productive behaviour' is a fundamental flaw. This paper is not suggesting that violence in the workplace should be condoned under any circumstances; however, the currently accepted view of counter-productive behaviours is far too broad and all encompassing. Some actions may indeed be 'counter-productive' from the perspective of the organisation, yet they allow an important means of maintaining situational power on the part of the employee (Chen and Spector 1992 cited in Miles, Borham, Spector and Fox, 2002). One might say that using the label 'counter-productive' is in itself, counter-productive.

In recent years there has been a substantial increase in the number of hours Australian employees work (ABS 2002; 2004). At the same time, there has been an increasing level of work intensification within Australia (Allan, O'Donnell and Peetz 1999; Peetz, Townsend, Fox and Allan 2004). These practices which are largely employer driven are having a counterproductive effect on the lives of many people. The assumption that over-worked employees spending an amount of time 'day-dreaming' or measuring their output is 'counter-productive behaviour' is a 'blame the victim' approach that adds little value. There needs to be further theoretical development of employee behaviours to recognise that not all actions (e.g. day-dreaming) that fail to conform to organisational rules are CPBs that need to be eliminated. This paper will now introduce the case study organisation, FoodWorks.

THE CASE STUDY CONTEXT

FoodWorks is a food-processing plant on a greenfield site in Queensland. According to a leadership team member as the development of the plant progressed they became more aware of the opportunities available to them.

"We wanted a flat structure and to ensure that quality and open communication developed. We wanted to lead not to manage - we wanted to seek guidance from the team members not instruct."

The organisation wanted to implement SAWTs with sophisticated personnel recruitment processes, payment structured for successful achievement of team goals and a multi-skilled staff. While the goal was of course, to develop a successful business, the management team recognised that this would be achieved in part through the 'right people'. Employees would be selected on the basis of their likelihood to fit the culture of commitment, and de-selected based on the likelihood of engaging in CPBs.

One early example of a teambuilding exercise saw the employees divided into groups to determine 'team norms' for the organisation. The most commonly determined norms were what one would expect including: helping each other, respect each other, do job properly, be punctual, 'sharing the vision', being equal team members, trust each other, be proud to be part of the team, have fun safely, share your ideas, share your knowledge, do what you think is right (quality). In addition to this, team norms are printed on the back of the employee's ID card as a constant reminder of what is expected of employees to be 'good soldiers' (Organ 1988: 4). Furthermore, much thought was placed into the development of the plant to ensure efficient production processes as well as limiting the opportunities for employees to misuse their time.

The data for this research was primarily collected through an eight month period of ethnographic participant-observation where extensive discussions could be held with employees. While it is recognised that there are limitations in ethnography, this methodological approach is extensively recognised as valuable when sensitive topics (such as CPBs) are being investigated (Friedmann and McDaniel 1998; Neumann 2000; Vinten 1994; Yin 1994). In addition to the ethnographic aspect of this data collection process, 13 interviews were conducted with management representatives and union officials. Finally, the examination of organisational documentation added to the data collection process. The data collection occurred throughout 2003 and 2004.

EMPLOYEE SELECTION AT FOODWORKS

Until recent times, organisations have commonly had a recruitment goal of attracting large numbers of applicants (Wanous 1992). Many of these rudimentary recruitment processes focus upon job-centred technical skills. However, the efficacy of this approach has been questioned. It has been suggested that 'post-hire' outcomes, such as job satisfaction of new recruits and initial job performance should be more important for organisations (Breaugh and Starke 2000). Included in this approach are recruitment systems based around more intangible qualities within the person. For example, organisations can seek to match an applicant's adaptability, teamwork skills, self-confidence, and degree of optimism to the existing organisational culture. While it is expected that various organisations engage in different recruiting methods, there is a growing body of literature that recognises the 'person centred' approach to finding the attitude to match the organisation, rather than the skills to match the tasks (Alvesson and Willmott 2002; Callaghan and Thompson 2002; Findlay, McKinlay, Marks and Thompson 2000; Hallier 2001; Jewell and Siegall 1990; Thompson and Findlay 1999).


An additional important role of recruitment is a form of organisational 'gate-keeping'. That is to say, that those employees involved in recruiting are responsible for ensuring only the appropriate persons are employed. The role is two-fold; the gate-keeper must be sure to allow the right people in, but also, to ensure the wrong people are kept out. Furthermore, many organisations place a substantially greater importance on a person's personality than their experience, training and technical skills (Nickson, Warhurst, Witz and Cullen 2001). As such, clichés become the order of Human Resource (HR) and Recruitment Departments with terminology like 'We recruit attitude' (Callaghan and Thompson 2002); 'if they are willing to learn they are better to employ' (Townsend 2004) and the aim to identify 'individuals' with 'suitable characteristics' (van den Broek 2003). However, the evidence of the effect that recruitment methods have on job performance is, at best, mixed (Rhynes 1991; Henly 2000; DeVaro and Fields 2002). Yet, as Blyton and Turnbull (1998) note, the easiest way to develop a compliant workforce is to recruit one.

The catchment area selected for the FoodWorks worksite provided the organisation with a prospective labour market that was both low-skilled, and had a relatively high unemployment rate (ABS 2001). In addition, the area is known for being a manufacturing region with more than sixteen percent of the workforce involved in industrial employment (LOED 1998). For the FoodWorks management, the relatively high unemployment rate was beneficial as a means to recruit people who did not have deeply entrenched approaches to work that would be unsuitable within the FoodWorks culture. In August 2001, the project team began their

first major level of recruitment. Two months was devoted to recruiting approximately 30 people into positions such as team leaders, R&D staff, QA staff and administration staff.

The FoodWorks HR officer established a recruitment process (summarised in Figure 1) in an attempt to hire 'correct individual(s)'. Managerial representatives for the organisation continually state the mantra that they look for 'ability and attitude – not skills'. This ability and attitude often becomes apparent through FoodWorks's final stages of recruitment: a half-day of role-playing and behavioural interviews. An example of the role-play is a scenario where the members of a work team must resolve a problem in their production process. Alternatively, they have a team member who has a negative approach to her work and the team must 'get Jo back on track'. The HR officer reports that the recruits that are sought are demonstrably 'team focused and caring people' and that 'the role-playing is most indicative of who will be successful.' At FoodWorks high expectations are placed in the recruiting process to find people that will commit to the organisation.

Figure 1: FoodWorks Recruitment Process Summary



TEAMS AND THE ORGANISATION OF WORK

This worksite was designed with the basic premise of a flow-shop. Some benefits of such a design include the efficient use of space, and constant processing times (Meredith and Shafer 2002). Another key factor in the plant design was that the organisation would be utilising a JIT production system. The JIT system was pioneered within Toyota Motors, with the idea that components are delivered in precise quantities and at the exact time that they are needed in the production process. Tight quality control is essential with this style of system, as defective or insufficient parts immediately disrupt production. JIT can be seen as a relatively simple way of effectively coordinating the production process in which a large group of different components are ultimately assembled into a final product (Benders and Van Hootegem 2000; Turnbull 1998). In the case at FoodWorks, the final product is a single serve, frozen meal.

Ideally for management, there was no requirement for most employees to be going further than ten to twenty metres for all the equipment they required, regardless of the section in which they worked. Management wanted a plant design that would provide an efficient use of all potentially productive time and, as a consequence, limit employee CPBs in terms of the (re)appropriation of time (Ackroyd and Thompson 1999; Thompson and Ackroyd 1995). A plant layout where employees are not required to move far from their workspace would limit the possibility of employee 'loafing' and potentially avoid the temptation of employee 'theft of time'.

All processes are monitored and much of the machinery is computerised therefore limiting the number of employees required. Recipes developed by the R&D team are incorporated into the mainframe computer system and drive the thermal processing equipment. Hence, with aspects similar to what Wright and Lund (1996) refer to as 'computerised Taylorism', employees must simply follow instructions on the computer screen for 45 minutes to cook the equivalent of 10 000 serves of pasta sauce!

In comparison to what is commonly understood to be a team responsibility in SAWTs, the production schedules are determined by management staff, with the employees assigned their work stations by team leaders. Again, unlike what is commonly understood to be a dimension of SAWTs, team leaders were selected by management, rather than democratically selected by team members. Furthermore, team members were selected by management, again, quite dissimilar to the notion of SAWTs that can often be self-selecting. In the cooking area of the processing plant, the employees are provided with processes that allow for considerable offtask time. Team members may, for example, be required to cook 100 bags of pasta and 100 bags of vegetables in a shift. This would require spending ten minutes gathering the first 10 bags of pasta and pouring them onto a conveyor belt. The cooking process may take 20 minutes, during which time the employee must dispose of their bags and gather more pasta. With any additional time the team members may have, they 'help out' other members of the team. For example, the team member can collect more chicken fillets for the belt grill, remove soiled trays to be cleaned and so on. As suggested by Blauner (1964) the ability to control the pace of work and the freedom of physical movement reduce the workers' alienation from, or disenchantment in the production system. It comes as no surprise that FoodWorks employees in the most part prefer to work in this section of the workplace.

Employees in the low-risk section are provided with the opportunity to determine their own lunch breaks around their work schedule. This is significantly different from teams in other

sections who have their breaks determined by the end of a production run. The employees in the high-risk section are charged primarily with assembling meals into individual packages. These teams are called 'the assembly teams'. Assembling meals is achieved through two lines of 10 employees on conveyor belts, each station contributing another cooked ingredient. Wherever possible, this system is automated. The level of teamwork within this section of the workplace is questionable. Rather than 'teamwork' these employees are involved in what Sharpe (2002) refers to as sequential interdependency.

Meal trays pass along the conveyor belt at the speed of three every two seconds. Assembling a meal in this area would require two people to alternate the inserting of, for example, a chicken fillet; two people to alternate inserting a scoop of mashed potato; followed by an automated gravy measure; two employees to alternate a contribution of six beans; and another two people to alternate adding three carrots to complete the meal. A further person is at the end of the conveyor belt to add or remove vegetables to ensure the correct weight for quality purposes. A lid is automatically placed on the meal before it proceeds through the freezer. These employees are 'on-task' for almost all of their working day. Each of these teams has day shift teams and afternoon shift teams.

Upon production commencing at this greenfield site, there was a larger than expected initial workload. As a result, the organisation inserted another layer of management into the hierarchy soon after opening, contrary to the aforementioned SAWT expectations. A combination of the labour process and the increasing level of managerial authority means that the teams in this workplace are not SAWTs as the management had initially intended. The limited levels of control for employees and teams means that at best, the teams are similar to 'lean production' teams and, at worst, they are reflective of what has been referred to as 'teams without teamworking' (van den Broek, Callaghan and Thompson 2004).

DISCUSSION

At this point we shall introduce the analogy of building a house to developing an organisation. In this case, the builders had a 'vision' of the completed house. However, when drawing the plans and building the structure, the developers failed to consider the strength that the internal walls provide to the house. At FoodWorks, a great deal of attention was paid to complex and thorough selection processes and the organisation of work and team structure. From the outside, the house looked strong. However, the remuneration system was poorly considered and the employees, once inside the organisation, found this as a substantial weakness.

A large percentage of the CPBs at FoodWorks are a result of an increasing level of dissatisfaction with rates of pay. FoodWorks employees are comparatively low paid by industry and national standards. In the early stages of the organisation's development there was much focus on employee commitment to the company. With the promise of this workplace being better and different to other workplaces, employees did engage in OCBs and 'take that extra step' in the early days. However, cases of employees taking that extra step became more infrequent as frustrations grew with the levels of pay for operators. Reflecting the frustrations with pay policies found by Greenberg and Alge (1998), one operator suggests:

It's such bad pay and you're expected to give everything. When I look at my pay of \$520 compared to the thousand or two thousand (dollars) a week the others (the management team) get...you realise we're not really all equal in this place.

This view is commonly expressed throughout the organisation. With employees showing a high level of dissatisfaction with the outcome of the wage/effort bargain, a pluralist interpretation of the employment relationship suggests that this dissatisfaction will manifest itself in CPBs (Hollinger and Clark 1983; Greenberg and Scott 1996 cited in Skarlicki and Folger 1997).

While there is no doubt some degree of employee dissatisfaction in pay levels regardless of parity, these employees did receive comparatively low wages. Entry level employees were paid the federal minimum wage (at the time approximately \$430), while the top level employees' base wage was \$530—still well short of the \$880 average weekly earnings in Australia at that time (Watts, 2003). What can only be regarded as a poorly considered tactic by managers in enterprise bargaining, employees were provided with a graph indicating that they were being paid similar to what regional competitors were being paid—two years prior!

There are many examples of employees utilising their privileged position of being a cooking team member to engage in CPBs aimed at the management team. For example, the process of cooking pasta takes approximately 20 minutes, and the team leader told the operator that a batch was required in five minutes. The operator says that such occurrences 'piss (her) off' and enlisted the researcher's assistance to engage in an act of resistance. The operator told how slowing production would mean that any down-time for the other section would be costed back to the cooking team. Hence:

... I've (fed) so much friggin' penne (pasta) into the cooker that they'll have so much they don't know what to do with it. That gives me extra time on my hands and I can relax a little while they sweat trying to find places to store the penne.

In other examples of CPBs, many employees refused to engage in one of the central tenets of the FoodWorks culture. Part of the managerial strategy is to develop multiskilled teams of employees in an attempt to increase functional flexibility. In developing multiskilled employees, there is a policy of job rotation that has not been adequately implemented. One reason that this policy has not been completely implemented is due to employee resistance. Many employees of the two cooking teams recognise that they have greater task freedoms and a more stimulating work environment in the low-risk area.

Furthermore, due to production pressures there has been limited opportunity to train new employees to use much of the equipment. Consequently, cooking team members hold a privileged position in terms of the best jobs, and they are in a comparatively powerful position as they are a select few with the skills to operate the equipment. As one operator explains:

...they want to rotate us, but I'm not going. Fuck that, I don't want to go and work in the (assembly teams)...I don't think I'll have to at the moment because there's only six of us that can operate this equipment. If they had more, then I'd...leave (resign) because there's no way I'm going back around there.

Employees are using a range of reasons to resist the managerial policy of job rotation. Importantly, all these comments come from operators from the cooking teams who are resisting managerial attempts to be rotated to the assembly teams. One employee says of the need to buy a new car if they shifted to the assembly team and as a consequence had a later starting time; and 'on \$400 a week, that's impossible.'

Common within JIT systems is the expectation, both implicit and explicit, that employees use their tacit knowledge of processes to reduce wastage in the system (Boyer and Durand 1997; Delbridge and Turnbull 1992; Delbridge, Turnbull and Wilkinson 1992; Kenney and Florida 1993). This knowledge is commonly shared through team meetings and quality circles for the benefit of team members and the management. However, it is commonly documented that when employees provide their knowledge for the benefit of others, it will lead to work intensification (Garrahan and Stewart 1992; Rinehart, Huxley and Robertson 1997).

Employees at FoodWorks recognise the potential down-side of passing up knowledge and explain their reticence to do so. One employee tells that it may take a few days or a few weeks but they often find easier ways to perform new processes. Nevertheless:

...if it makes things easier then you tell everyone but if it means we have to work faster then I'd talk about it with the others before we decide to tell the supervisor or team leader.

The manifestation of CPBs in the processing plant is more apparent in the teams that have higher levels of off-task time. Employees tell how they enjoy the cooking section because of the ability to pace their own work and time their breaks:

You can have a 15-minute break and make it a 30-minute break if you can get away with it...

The example of employees extending their meal breaks became problematic for the management team. In response a team meeting was convened to counsel the cooking team members about taking extended breaks. Operators suggest with regard to this disciplinary meeting:

Typical of them. They tell us we have autonomy and we take some and then get in trouble for it.

Sometimes I think that this is a good place to work because we get treated a little better, then something like this happens and I realise it's the same old shit just in a different place with different people.

It is an important aspect of CPBs to recognise that it does not necessarily reflect an employee's level of dissatisfaction with their employment (Ackroyd and Thompson 1999; Lupton 1963).

Scope and opportunity are described as key variables that contribute to the extent of pilfering and stealing within an organisation (Ditton 1977). This paper demonstrates that these variables can be transferred to other forms of employee actions in the workplace as well. Based on Ditton's work, it is understandable that the cooking teams have greater opportunity. In addition, team leaders are also in the position of having greater levels of scope and opportunity to engage in CPBs. However not all employees are *motivated* to engage in CPBs.

Team leaders are not immune from engaging in CPBs. While it is generally accepted that managerial staff are bound together to achieve the organisation's goals and are driven by a

sense of teamwork, flexibility and ambition (Biggs and Horgan 1999; Noon and Blyton 1997), it has been recognised that managerial staff, particularly middle-managers are not always dedicated to the goals of the organisation (Scarborough and Burrell 1996; Smith 1990; Townsend 2003). Furthermore, the relationships that team leaders or managers develop vary between teams and employees can have quite positive feelings towards some team leaders while objecting strongly to others (Delbridge 2000).

At FoodWorks the adventures of one particular team leader were commonly discussed amongst the employees. Some comments include:

He's a ripper. We call him 'Heidi' because he's always hiding.

When we're on nights, we can take it a little easy, because we know (the team leader) won't be around all that much. As soon as the big bosses go, he seems to get very busy elsewhere.

Interestingly, there were members from all of the teams that held a similar view concerning this team leader. Clearly, the selection process and team structure did not have the desired effect of eliminating the presence of CPBs.

Previous research has raised concerns about the coercive nature of developing a devotional, almost evangelistic team culture and ideology (Barley and Kunda 1992). Without question, the reward system is the biggest challenge to the culture faced by FoodWorks management. Similarly, Ezzemal and Willmott (1998) recognised pay systems prevented the implementation of SAWTs in their study. FoodWorks employees report that in the early stages of operation, there were high levels of commitment to the organisation and the culture in all its interpretations. However, as time progressed, there were increasing levels of dissatisfaction from employees with the perceived level of commitment they were providing, and the real rates of pay they were receiving. Or, put another way, employees saw their commitment as far outweighing the commitment from the organisation.

At this point we return to the two main areas of the organisation that were intended to develop the 'right' employee behaviours. The selection process may have provided a gate to allow recruits that were more likely to engage in OCBs and less likely to engage in CPBs. However, the teams did not evolve into the promised SAWTs. Furthermore, another important factor in the working lives of people was not adequately developed – the remuneration system. The following comments from employees demonstrate the link between work and non-work life that can result in CPBs.

Really, it all comes down to the money. When you get paid shit then there are so many aspects of your life you can't enjoy.

It's still a fucked job and rolling around play dough or running through the car park with a balloon isn't going to change that, is it? Cut the shit and start paying us a little bit more and maybe some of us will be happier.

There is a growing dissatisfaction from employees at FoodWorks. There is a constant referral to 'us and them' on the part of the employees and managers alike. Commonly, this phrase is followed by a pause and corrections along the lines of 'well, we'; or as employees roll their

eyes and say 'I know we're not supposed to say us and them, I know we're supposed to be all part of the team, but we're not really...' This dissatisfaction is resulting in more frequent examples of CPBs.

CONCLUSION

The management team of this greenfield site decided that they would be able develop a successful operation around a complex selection process for low-skilled employees. The selection process was aimed at finding recruits with an attitude that would result in a relatively high level of OCBs and avoid CPBs. Furthermore, by implementing a structure of SAWTs the employees would feel empowered and have a level of self-responsibility that would benefit the organisation.

However, as this case study investigation has shown, the SAWTs failed to evolve through a combination of the labour processes and management not providing adequate authority to the teams. This, in combination with another important failure of the management of this organisation meant that CPBs began, and spread throughout the workplace. The management at FoodWorks failed to provide employees with an adequate remuneration package. Low wages, combined with unmet expectations on the part of the management meant that employees were increasingly becoming dissatisfied with their positions and engaged in more CPBs.

This is an important message to managers of organisations. The employment relationship is a multi-faceted relationship and not easy to manage. Employees do not hold the same level of power as management, and when employees feel that their needs are not being adequately met, they will respond. Often the most appropriate way the less powerful find to respond is through covert actions that provide them with an increase level of power over the situation in which they find themselves.

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