RUNNING HEAD: Examining Australia's Convicted Terrorists

Radicalization in Australia: Examining Australia's Convicted Terrorists

Louise E. Porter

ARC Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security, Griffith University

Mark R. Kebbell

ARC Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security, Griffith University

Address for correspondence:

Dr Louise Porter

ARC Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security

Suite 3.01, M10

Mt Gravatt Campus

Griffith University

Messines Ridge Road

Mt Gravatt Qld 4122

Email: l.porter@griffith.edu.au

Tel: +61 7 373 51035

Fax: +61 7 373 51033

Word Count: 7856

Abstract

This paper explores theories radicalization by analysing the twenty-one individuals convicted to-date under Australian anti-terrorism laws. All twenty-one are Australian citizens and so are discussed with reference to literature on home-grown terrorists. Open source data in the form of media and law reports were collected and analysed for descriptive features of the individuals and their involvement in terrorism-related activities. Themes consistent with elements of process models of radicalisation were found, particularly identity issues, ideology, capability and group dynamics. The features analysed are discussed in relation to social attachments and rationalisations, as well as counter-radicalization initiatives.

Keywords: home-grown, radicalisation, terrorism, terrorist

Radicalization in Australia: Examining Australia's Convicted Terrorists

To-date, 21 Australian citizens have been convicted under anti-terrorism law for terrorism-related activities in Australia. The purpose of this paper is to examine the convicted terrorists in light of both individual and process models of violent extremism to shed light on the emergence of terrorist activity in Australia in comparison with other nations.

Recent studies of terrorists have highlighted the increasing incidences of home-grown Islamist terrorists in the West (e.g., Bakker, 2006; Cole & Cole, 2009; Innes, 2007; Netherlands Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, 2006; and for a definition of Islamist see Hussain, 2007). Perspectives of these studies range from studying the individuals to find some underlying individual differences between terrorists and non-terrorists (Krueger, 2008) through to situational or process models that look more at the conditions that individuals are exposed to, which shape an individual to form particular beliefs. This latter concept has been termed a process of radicalisation. However, there is not complete agreement over what such a process, or indeed the term "radicalisation", actually entails. Innes, at al. (2007) define radicalisation as "a process involving significant change in an individual's or group's orienting beliefs and motivations. Through processes of radicalisation some people will come to assume an extremist viewpoint, wherein they are willing to countenance or enact violence in pursuit of their goals" (Innes, et al., 2007, p.38). Silber and Bhatt (2007) state that "The progression of searching, finding, adopting, nurturing, and developing this extreme belief system to the point where it acts as a catalyst for a terrorist act defines the process of radicalization" (p16).

In this paper radicalisation is taken as the process by which individuals (or groups) change their beliefs, adopt an extremist viewpoint and advocate (or practice)

violence to achieve their goals. The following sections will discuss both individual and process theories as they relate to the end product of a radicalised individual or group in the context of Islamist terrorism. Within this context, aspects of religion and religious rhetoric are frequently used by extremists, but often with interpretations that are supporting of the extremist ideology and contrary to many mainstream interpretations. For example, Lentini and Bakashmar (2007) show how some interpretations of Jihad used to justify indiscriminate violence against non-Muslims are not compatible with more sophisticated, and accepted, interpretations of Islam. It is important, therefore, that examples of such rhetoric offered throughout this paper are understood within the extremist context and not understood as reflecting Islam more generally.

Individual Models

Several studies have approached terrorism from an individual perspective, searching for commonalities among samples of terrorists, and differences between terrorists and non-terrorists with respect to background, socio-demographics and psychopathology. Krueger (2008) examined the characteristics of a sample of US home-grown Islamic terrorists and compared them with a sample of Muslim Americans. Few differences were found, with alleged terrorists were slightly better educated, younger, less likely to be US citizens and slightly less likely to be converts to Islam than other Muslims living in America. Further, only "years of schooling" was positively related to support for terrorism, while age, citizenship and a birth region of "other" (primarily Iran) were negatively related to support for terrorism (Krueger, 2008).

Several further studies have compared terrorists with non-terrorists (either general population or politically active controls) and have found no differences in psychopathology or family background (Ferracuti 1982; Ferracuti & Bruno 1981), socioeconomic or educational factors (Merari, 2004). This has led many to conclude that there is no common terrorist profile (e.g. Bakker, 2006; Copland, 2005; Dean, 2007; Hudson, 1999; Atran & Sageman, 2006). Indeed, Gordon (2002) suggests that, in relation to 'suicide' bombers, "the nature of those involved … is liable to evolve according to circumstances, although with nationalist and, at times, religious motivation being the most central" (p286). This has led to more situational, process driven models to explain involvement in terrorism.

Process Models

The Netherlands Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (2006) refers to 'European jihad' and claims that this home-grown threat involves a grass-roots process of radicalisation leading to local networks that operate predominantly under their own volition and independent from international terrorist networks. Bakker (2006) similarly noted that European terrorist networks showed few cases of foreign connections and links. Bakker contrasted this to Sageman's (2004) earlier conclusion, which was based on his study of 172 participants in the Salafi jihad, that links to the global Salafi network were important to terrorist groups (see also, Cole & Cole, 2009). Thus, in comparison to earlier incidents of terrorist networks, the emerging, localised (European) networks seem often to exist without any formal acceptance or support from terrorist organisations but, rather, are "spurred on by local circumstances" (Ministry of Interior and Kingdom Relations, 2006, p.5).

Innes, Abbott, Lowe and Roberts (2007) also discuss a situational model of radicalisation where circumstances, or conditions, align to produce a time of particular vulnerability, termed a "radicalisation window". Included in their model is the condition of connection to a global community of Islam, not in the form of any formal terrorism links, but links to "an imagined global Muslim Community" (p.5) that influences through salience of global events, a discourse of global injustice and global jihad, and is supported by jihadist propaganda on the internet (Innes, et al., 2007). This is set within the wider condition of "ideology" that provides motivations and beliefs that support and legitimise the use of violence. The remaining conditions for radicalisation are identified as inter- and intra-community separation (experiencing social identity difficulties due to the perceived separation of the Muslim community from the majority community followed by increased isolation from their own community), and group dynamics in the presence of like-minded individuals to offer social support and status. In addition to these conditions, Innes et al. describe four catalysts as triggering the adoption of the extremist perspective: signal events (typically negative but can be personal, group or collective); declining social control in the form of perceived irrelevancy of both informal and formal methods of solving problems in their community; differential association, with increasing isolation from mainstream Muslim contacts and increased interaction with extremists, and; indoctrination of the ideology and full identification with the imagined global Islamic community.

Interestingly, Innes et al. (2007) state that their model does not incorporate capability and planning behaviour as this is seen to be behaviour after the belief system is acquired. Thus the model describes circumstances and events leading to formulation of beliefs and potentially joining of particular groups, rather than violent

action itself. Further, the model, while describing a process, does not dictate the sequence or pathways through which individuals experience the conditions and catalysts. In this way, it allows for diverse pathways to the same end product.

In contrast, although with some similarities, Silber and Bhatt (2007) offer a sequential stage model to explain the process from what they term "pre-radicalization", that is, circumstances of vulnerability before an individual begins the process, to an end of "Jihadization", which involves behaviour towards planning an attack. Silber and Bhatt's (2007) pre-radicalization stage echos some of the sentiments of Innes et al.'s (2007) inter-community separation. However, Silber and Bhatt's model also incorporates specific individual characteristics at this stage, for example, male Muslims under the age of 35 years, who are often second or third generation immigrants but residents and/or citizens of Western democracies. Bakker (2006) agrees and further states that, with regard to European terrorists, the next generation immigrants typically have roots in Arab countries, often North Africa. However, he goes on to conclude that there are no consistent patterns to be found in relation to occupation, marital status, age or place of residence, although he does note that most of his sample are single men, which is in contrast to Sageman's (2004) global terrorist sample of mainly married men.

Silber and Bhatt (2007) continue that those vulnerable at the pre-radicalisation stage are often educated and from middle class backgrounds. They have little, if any previous criminal involvement and are described as "having "ordinary" lives and jobs" (p.23). However, Bakker (2006) speaks differently in relation to his all-European sample, stating that they come from "the lower strata of society" (p.43) and calling attention to the high number (around a quarter) who had a criminal record. The

result of the experiences characterised above has been linked by Innes, et al (2007) to the sociological theory of anomie and also Matza's (1964) theory of 'drift'.

Lastly, in terms of their Muslim faith, Silber and Bhatt (2007) state that those who go on to be radicalised are not necessarily devout Muslim or radical in any way to begin with. Indeed, according to Bakker (2006), many of the European terrorists rediscovered their faith or showed evidence of their faith increasing just prior to recruitment. Further, Silbert and Bhatt (2007) describe those who are recent converts to Islam as particularly vulnerable to the radical message, a statement supported by others (e.g. Bakker, 2006; Bergin, Jones & Ungerer, 2007).

Silber and Bhatt's (2007) *Self-identification* stage follows the pre-radicalisation stage, most likely, it is said, for those who experience some form of trigger event (for example economic struggle, social alienation, political conflict or loss of family members) that increases the person's need to establish an identity, or choose which direction to follow. This is similar to Innes, et al.'s (2007) concept of signal events, where they describe personal events such as loss of employment, to more collective events such as interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, as impacting on perceptions of security and shifts in beliefs. Silber and Bhatt (2007) suggest that this pursuit of identity and direction often brings the individual to regular attendance of a Salafi Mosque. Bakker (2006) also notes that members of his European sample changed liberal mosques for more orthodox or extremist ones.

Similar to Innes, et al.'s (2007) condition of group dynamics and catalyst of differential association, Silber and Bhatt (2007) explain that the belief shift outlined above is then accompanied by the need for validation and, so, often like-minded individuals are sought or become more important in the person's life. Bakker (2006), too, highlighted social affiliation as influential in around two-thirds of European

terrorist networks, with within-network similarities in terms of age and country of family origin. These social bonds were also found to extend beyond friendship to kinship, with more than one family member becoming involved in the same terrorist network. Indeed, Bakker (2006) concluded that, while it may differ across networks, kinship seems to be more important than friendship in European networks, while Sageman (2004) found friendship bonds to be more important for his sample.

Whilst Innes outlines, indoctrination as a catalyst, Silber and Bhatt outline indoctrination as a third stage of the radicalization process. It is at this third stage of indoctrination that the individual accepts and internalises the extremist ideas. As Azzam (2007) explains, due to certain (pre-radicalisation) factors, a minority of Muslims may feel angry towards their home country, marginalised and/or disadvantaged, and may have a tendency towards violence and crime. Further, Western policies may be viewed as anti-Muslim and are taken personally. Having moved towards orthodox Islam, the package offered by the extremist perspective is attractive: it serves as a legitimate expression of these feelings and encourages (and condones) violent action.

Innes et al. remarks on the ability of violent extremists to justify or legitimise violence and draws on Sykes and Matza's (1957) techniques of neutralization, specifically 'appealing to higher loyalties', viewing victims as 'deserving of their fate', and 'condemning the condemners'. Silber and Bhatt (2007) propose that the justification for the extremist perspective is often provided by a 'spiritual sanctioner' who provides radical interpretations of the *Qur'an* (Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, 2006) and may be intensified by a withdrawal from the Mosque to more clandestine meetings of like-minded individuals.

Silber and Bhatt's (2007) final stage of radicalisation is termed *Jihadization* and involves acceptance of the violent jihad mission. At this stage, the group of people mixing together at stage three may begin referring to themselves as 'mujahideen' and engage in group bonding exercises, some of which may provide pseudo-military training (e.g. paintballing) or may involve travel abroad to actual terrorist training camps (Bakker, 2006). This stage, therefore, involves preparation for action, which may lead to planning an actual attack (target selection, procurement of materials, etc.).

Aims

This paper is a step towards describing and explaining the Australian context and with the recent convictions and sentencing and the release of new open source data through the law reports (i.e., R v. xxx), it is timely and of relevance to radicalization and de-radicalization in Australia. Clearly there are overlaps between models that have been proposed to explain engagement in violent extremism and indeed there does not have to be a unitary path into violent extremism (Davis & Cragin, 2009). Innes, et al., (2007) suggest that both their own model and that of Silber and Bhatt (2007) are in need of empirical testing this paper sheds light on these processes.

Method

Sample

The sample for this study contains the 21 people who have been convicted under anti-terrorism laws in Australia, at the time of writing. All 21 have been convicted under Australian law for activities in Australia and/or directed towards Australian targets and are male Australian citizens. The 21 are Jack Roche, Faheem

Lodhi, Belal Khazaal, Abdul Nacer Benbrika and his followers in Melbourne: Aimen

Joud, Abdullah Merhi, Ahmed Raad, Fadal Sayadi, Amer Haddara, Ezzit Raad and

Izzydeen Atik and those convicted in Sydney as part of the same operation (Operation

Pendennis): Mohammed Ali Elomar, Mazen Touma, Abdul Rakib Hasan, Khaled

Cheikho, Moustafa Cheikho, Khaled Sharrouf, Mirsad Mulahalilovic, Omar Baladjam

and Mohammed Jamal (see Appendix for details of convictions).

Data collection

The cases were identified from the Attorney General's website

(http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/agd.nsf/Page/Nationalsecurity_Counter-

terrorismandrelatedcases). Information on each case was then collected through the

relevant Law reports supplemented with newspaper articles concerning the cases.

Roche, Lodhi and Khazaal were each tried in separate cases. Benbrika and his

Melbourne group were tried together as part of the same case as were the Sydney

group. As shown in Table 1, at least one Law report was available for each case, with

10 available for the Sydney group and 37 available for the Benbrika and Others case.

Operation Pendennis also attracted a large amount of media attention and 89

newspaper reports of Benbrika and others case and 26 for the Sydney group were

analysed. In total, 169 newspaper reports and 71 law reports were collected as the data

for this paper.

[Insert Table 1 here]

While it is recognised that newspaper reports may provide a selective

presentation of case material, they are produced from a variety of sources of

information. Further, a number of different newspaper publications were drawn upon

to help balance the perspective of individual reporters. The addition of the Law

reports themselves enables access to the facts as accepted by the court, thus increasing the reliability of the information. Newspaper accounts and law reports have been used effectively in research on other topics and discussions of the data can be found in Porter (2008). More discussion of data?

Data coding

The Law and media reports were analysed for descriptive features of the individuals (e.g., characteristics and background) and also their actions and associations that led to their convictions. From here, specific features were organised around the themes relevant to the radicalisation literature. Features were coded as present/absent for each case and, where possible, quotes from the individuals were collected to illustrate the presence of particular attitudes and justifications. Quotes were available from a variety of sources such as letters, interviews and, in the case of Operation Pendennis, extracts presented from the conversations recorded by covert surveillance. The nature of the dataset means that there is inevitably the potential for missing factors that are not reported and this must be bourne in mind in interpreting the results. While it is acknowledged that the use of open-source data is limited in terms of the richness and personal nature of the material available, the current study did use multiple sources and drew, where possible, on quotes from the individuals themselves.

Results

The following provides a descriptive analysis of the characteristics, behaviour and background experiences of the 21 individuals with respect to themes of Background situation and characteristics (age, family background, attachments and criminal record); Identity changes (religious conversion and brotherhood identity);

Ideology and attitudes (recruitment and attitudes), and; Capability and active participation (group structure, literature and capability).

Background situation and characteristics

This section outlines characteristics and background of the sample members including their age, family background, attachments and criminal record. Such characteristics and experiences may have made them vulnerable to radicalisation.

Age and gender. The ages of the 21 convicted terrorists range from 20 years to 47 years old at the time of their involvement in the events that led to their conviction. The mean age of the 21 is 29 years (SD = 7.6 years), although two thirds of the sample were under the age of 30, three were in their 30's and three aged 40 or over. All were male.

[Insert Table 2 here]

Family background. While all of the twenty-one are Australian citizens, only nine were born in Australia: seven to Lebanese immigrant parents, one to Australian parents and one to an Australian mother and Indonesian father. The country of birth was unavailable in the data for three of the men. Four were born in Lebanon, and the remaining in Pakistan, Algeria, former Yugoslavia, Bangladesh and the UK. Those born overseas moved to Australia either as a very young child with their parents (n=3) or in their twenties (n=4). Thus, only four are known to have grown up outside Australia. These four had still been in Australia for between five and 22 years when they actually engaged in the terrorist related behaviour for which they were convicted. Lodhi had been in Australia five years, Mulahalilovic for 9 years, Benbrika for 16 years and Roche for 22 years.

While there was no information to suggest that Jack Roche had siblings, the majority of the sample had large numbers of siblings. The remaining ten men had between two and nine siblings with a mean of six siblings (SD ± 2).

Whilst the majority of the sample had no reported significant childhood experiences, two had divorced or separated parents, a further two experienced the death of their Mother as a child - Aimen Joud at age two and Jack Roche at age 13 - although Joud's father remarried. One had experienced significant problems at school, reportedly due to psychiatric problems, which led to his expulsion, and two experienced violence from their father.

Attachments. Fifteen of the 21 men had family relatives (siblings, parents, uncles/aunts or cousins) living in Australia (for 4 men this was unknown from the data). Sixteen were also married at the time of their involvement in terrorist activity (3 unknown), although one was described as having been unfaithful to his wife and one marriage was arranged. Of those who were married, twelve had children (between 1 and 7 children; mean 3; SD±2) and three had wives pregnant with their first child at the time of their arrest. None who had children were unmarried.

Information on the education level reached was only available for 13 of the 21 sample members. Of those 13, eight dropped out of school, three completed high school and two completed University level qualifications (one at undergraduate and one at postgraduate level).

In terms of employment, one (Lodhi) was an architect, having qualified in Pakistan and then worked to qualify in Australia, and one worked for a recruitment firm. Nine worked in vocational or manual jobs, including as an electrician (n=2), factory and/or building site work (n=4) or other tradesman (n=3). Three ran their own trades business while one developed a business selling various products on-line. One

relied on Fraud for income, including both fraudulent use of credit cards and fraudulently claiming benefits, and two were unemployed.

Lack of attachments. Five of the men were currently receiving, or had at some time received, welfare payments/ benefits. While this was claimed fraudulently in the case of Izzydeen Attik, three were for unemployment, two of which were for leaving work due to poor health or injury, while the third also reported health problems. One further man, Khaled Sharrouf was also drawing disability support pension. This means that they did not have the attachments that participation in the workforce brings.

In addition to experiencing physical health problems, the same five men also reported psychological disorders, some of which were confirmed by court appointed psychologists during their trial, although not all were accepted as completely truthful by the Judge (particularly in the case of Izzydeen Attik). Reported disorders covered adjustment disorder, anxiety, depression, paranoia, schizophrenia and low IQ.

In the case of Khazaal, these physical and psychological problems resulted in his reporting to be housebound and essentially isolated. Benbrika, too, showed increasing isolation, first in terms of isolation from people outside of his Muslim community, and later mainly associating with those who supported radical interpretations of Islam. Indeed, Benbrika is reportedly a self-taught Muslim cleric, choosing to study religion on his own rather than attending classes. Benbrika and his group showed later isolation within the Muslim community, breaking away from the local mosque. A further sign of a lack of attachment to the wider community can also be seen through Benbrika's lack of identification with Australia. In an interview for the ABC's 7.30 report in August 2005 Benbrika states the following:

> "… I don't believe in this country. I don't believe in this law which
>
> all this believe, no Allah but Allah, no Allah no other law of. This is
>
> the meaning of no Allah but Allah. I am telling you that my religion
>
> doesn't tolerate other religion. It doesn't tolerate. The only one law
>
> which needs to spread - it can be here or anywhere else - has to be
>
> Islam" (Benbrika speaking on The 7.30 report, 04/08/05)

Similarly, Sharrouf was recorded in conversation, with Mazen Touma, saying, "Forget Australia law…Australia law get stuffed" (R v Sharrouf, 2009, section 11)

Criminal record. Six of the men had a previous criminal record, one having been in prison. Offences on record were for dishonesty (n=2), theft (n=2), violence (n=2), firearms (n=1) and driving (n=2) offences. Seven men also reported addiction issues (including alcohol, drugs and gambling).

Identity changes

While some of the factors described above may create a vulnerability for involvement in terrorism many Australians share these characterstics and have no interest in involving themselves in terrorist activities. Involvement in terrorism requires more active or decisive behaviour. This section outlines more active factors regarding religious conversion and brotherhood identity.

Conversion or renewed interest in religion. While some of the men were raised in Muslim countries or attended an Islamic school in Australia, a prominent theme for ten of the 21 was converting to (n=3), or renewing their interest in (n=7) the Muslim faith prior to their involvement in terrorist activity. For two, this was triggered by a positive experience. Lodhi claimed that

> after his marriage, he felt a strong need to have a greater structure
>
> and focus in his life and it has been in this context that he has
>
> become more dedicated to the spiritual aspects of his life (R v
>
> Lodhi, 2006, p.10).

For Benbrika, "he perceived the observance of Islam to be becoming more difficult in his home country (of Algeria)" (R v Benbrika and Ors., 2009, p.5). His arrival in Australia meant that he felt more freedom to actively engage in religious activities and become an Islamic scholar.

For another eight men, negative events were the trigger, such as the death of a close family member (n=2), drug/alcohol addiction (n=4) and a combination of divorce and alcoholism (n=1). Finally, for one man, a combination of psychological symptoms, and exposure through a visit to a Muslim country and moving in with a religious relative, combined to encourage that individual to follow his Muslim faith with more vigour.

Brotherhood & group identity. For many, an attraction to terrorist involvement is through the collective identity that it represents or provides, through real or imagined connections/relationships. This collective might be a tangible, present group that provides real connections, such as the Benbrika group and Sydney cell, where not only were members meeting and participating in activities together regularly but ties between some group members extended to kinship. The Benbrika group included two brothers, as well as their school friend. The Sydney cell contained an uncle and nephew.

Benbrika increased the sense of the collective identity of the group through his speech by using inclusive first person pronouns (we, us, our) rather than second or

third person pronouns (you, them) and on occasion his speech shows conscious choice

through correction in the language he uses. For example, correcting "you" to "we":

"If you kill - we kill - here 1000, the Government is going to think"[1],

And correcting "them" to "us":

"Watch yourself, because if you show them what you want - (slapping noise) -

they gonna put them in - put us in - jail."[2]

In contrast to the tangible group outlined above, there also appeared to exist a

sense of a wider identity with Muslims across the globe and a sense of brotherhood

through sharing of that faith. For example, Roche, in a taped interview, spoke of "my

brothers and sisters of Islam"[3] and Khazaal talked of his book being at the request of

his brothers:

"This is but a short document I hastily prepared in response to a

request from brothers working to support this religion. I was

requested to prepare it, in this fashion, to serve as a reference to all

brothers or small cells desiring to support this religion.[4]

Similarly, the sense of identity is increased through the belief that the

brotherhood in-group is being mistreated by, or is at war with, the out-group (which

could be perceived as Westerners, non-Muslims, or anyone - including Muslims - that

does not support their extreme view of Islam). Thus, this identity is seen as a positive

united front, protecting its members from external attack. Two of the sample members

showed evidence of the belief that they were acting to defend their community. For

example Roche reportedly stated that:

"If someone punches you, you are allowed to punch them back. I

am very concerned about my brothers and sisters of Islam who

are being punched by these people."[5]

The sense of threat or injustice might, in some cases, be a notion gained from experience/exposure through charity work. For example, Benbrika was the President of the Algerian Society, the primary objective of which was accommodating Algerian refugees, Khazaal reportedly spent a lot of time working with angry Muslim youths, and Shane Kent undertook volunteer work for the Islamic Information and Support Centre of Australia (IISCA). However, others may not have direct experience but are exposed indirectly through the radical ideas of others.

Ideology and attitudes

This section outlines how the sample were recruited or exposed to radical ideas and illustrates some of the radical ideas and attitudes that were held in support of terrorism.

Recruitment/ exposure to radical ideas. Recruitment to terrorist groups is often through exposure to particular radical or extremist religious views through speeches or association with particular individuals or current members of groups. For example Jack Roche, after converting to Islam, became a regular at a particular mosque that was frequented by followers of the Australian branch of Jemaah Islamiyah (which was added to the UN Committee list of terrorist organisations in 2002). Meeting and hearing the alleged leader of JI, Roche stated he "liked what he was saying. It was very clear. It all made sense".(ref) Roche joined the Australian branch of JI after meeting further members.

Similarly Benbrika initially attended the Mosque of radical Melbourne Sheikh Mohamed Omran. Later Benbrika taught his version of Islam at Omran's Mosque and the men who later became members of Benbrika's group attended. Benbrika

eventually broke away from the Mosque, taking a number of followers with him to form his own group. This meant that he and his followers were isolated from less radical influences and Benbrika was free to teach his extremist ideas.

The recruitment process can be seen as a chain, whereby recruits then recruit others. For example, Roche attempted to recruit others in Australia under the direction of those he met in Afghanistan while, in the Benbrika group, Joud apparently recruited Atik as his credit card fraud skills were seen to be potentially useful to the group. Lodhi was also alleged to have tried to recruit an Australian Muslim for training in Pakistan. However, the charges against that individual and against Lodhi regarding recruitment were dropped.

Religious and political views legitimating violence and killing in the West. One of the most prominent themes among the sample is that of attitudes, evident in their speech, that advocate and justify the use of violence for the purposes of 'jihad'. Eleven of the 21 sample members showed evidence of directly advocating violence against, or killing of, non-Muslims. For example, Khazaal's 'terrorism manual' described various violent means by which "Small groups with small available means can cause horror to American and Jew alike"[6], while Benbrika was recorded telling followers that "It is permissible to kill [inaudible] the killing of protected women, the elderly and children"[7].

An important supporter of violent beliefs is justification and the sample members show evidence of justifications, either religious or political, that support the views described above. Ten of the sample members openly expressed that their religion supported jihad, or the use of violence against those who do not share their religious views. For example, Benbrika stated that Jihad was a part of his religion and when asked by a reporter whether he should stop young Muslims from wanting to

train for Jihad, Benbrika responded that "If I do this, it means I am betraying my religion"[8]. Further, Roche stated that "As Muslims we are obligated to perform jihad to uphold the laws of Allah" (R v Roche, 2005), and claimed that Jihad was justified against the non-believers. Similarly Mazen Touma spoke of an "obligation on every Muslim to defend his faith to fight for the religion of God against the infidels" (R v Touma, 2009, section 19). Indeed, such justifications are often set in language that dehumanises the objects of the jihad, typically by referring to them as non-believers or, using the term *kafir* (plural *kuffar*) from the *Qur'an*. While the term in the *Qur'an* refers to non-believers, culturally it is used as a derogatory term where *kuffar* are considered to be less human than Muslims. Members of the Benbrika group were reported to use such concepts to legitimize violence against non-Muslims, for example one member stated that both "the money and the blood of the kuffar are lawful" (Benbrika and Ors., 2009, p.9).

A strong religious justification for violence can also be seen in the concept of martyrdom, which four sample members expressed. Khazaal wrote, in the introduction of his terrorism manual,

> "I seek the Almighty's reward and I seek martyrdom for his sake. I do so running towards it not away from it. I beseech my brothers who read this message to pray that I may attain martyrdom."[9]

Further, Benbrika reportedly spoke of dying for Jihad and told followers that such a death brought great reward, including the forgiving of all sin, and that it was what Allah wants. Indeed, Benbrika espoused such a philosophy, allegedly to encourage one of his followers into martyrdom, teaching that martyrdom granted entry into paradise not only for the individual concerned but also for 70 members of his family,

as well as access to 72 virgins. Mazen Touma also spoke about Allah giving him paradise for martyrdom.

Political justifications were evident among the sample members, with eight referring to western Policies overseas and four referencing Policies in Australia as justification for violence. For example, Benbrika argued to his followers that Jihad was permitted against lands of war, which Australia was because it sent troops to Iraq in support of the US. Similarly Roche justified his involvement in planning a terrorist attack in Australia based on the fact that it was aimed at Israeli's and not Australians, and that Israeli's were legitimate targets because of their actions towards Palestine:

> "When I initially arrived from overseas I thought this is great. I couldn't
> see anything wrong with it. It's not aimed at Australian but Israeli and
> American men that we're following in their country. They are casualties
> of war (R v Roche, 2005, p.13).

Typically, the terrorist activity was then framed as a legitimate retaliation against the actions (political and non-political) of non-Muslims. For example, Benbrika spoke of general principles of legitimate retaliation, citing arguments such as "an eye for an eye" and saying that Allah supports retaliation for the killing of Muslim children by the *Kuffar*. Similarly, Roche expressed the need to use violence to protect and defend the Muslim community, both from violence itself, as well as defending against the spread of non-Muslim ideas and values,

> "As we see today, the disbelievers are now out of control and believe that
> their ways based on inequality, arrogance, et cetera, are right. I hate
> them for that and need to learn more about how to combat them" (R v
> Roche, 2005, p.24).

Benbrika, also goes further to suggest terrorist action as a strategic retaliation against overseas political and military action, particularly in relation to terrorist action in Australia as a message, or threat, to the Australian government to stop sending troops to countries like Iraq and Afghanistan.

Judge Whealy (R. v. Elomar & Ors.) summed this up very clearly with regards the beliefs of the five people convicted of terrorist offences in NSW. He stated that they all shared the following beliefs:

> "First, each was driven by the concept that the world was, in essence, divided between those who adhered strictly and fundamentally to a rigid concept of the Muslim faith, indeed, a medieval view of it, and to those who did not. Secondly, each was driven by the conviction that Islam throughout the world was under attack, particularly at the hands of the United States and its allies. In this context, Australia was plainly included. Thirdly, each offender was convinced that his obligation as a devout Muslim was to come to the defence of Islam and other Muslims overseas. Fourthly, it was the duty of each individual offender, indeed a religious obligation, to respond to the worldwide situation by preparing for violent jihad in this country, here in Australia."

Capability and active participation

The theme described here involves acts in preparation and furtherance of terrorist acts. The quotes given above demonstrate justification for violent jihad. This section will now focus on some of the behaviour that would indicate a furtherance of this mission. These include a formalised presence of the group (or individuals as part of a group) evident in certain group structural properties; use of literature and the internet, and; increasing capability (e.g. through training).

Structure and communication. One aspect of structure that is evident among the sample is the taking on of roles. For example, Roche, when recruited was given specific tasks to complete for the group – surveilling potential targets in Australia and recruiting other Australians – as well as acting as an interpreter for other JI members at times.

Benbrika's group was argued at trial to be organised and structured (although it was not accepted that the Crown proved any formal structure). Several members described themselves as 'elders' (Sayadi and Joud) and Benbrika, Sayadi, Joud and Ahmed Raad were said to comprise a consultative committee. Further roles were identified as 'treasurer' or keeper of the group joint fund (called a 'sandooq') and travel organiser (Atik). Indeed, the organisation of the group extended to obtaining income from a car-rebirthing scam and the use of fraudulently obtained credit card numbers to buy airline tickets. A further role identified in court was that of security officer (Sayadi). It was presented that Saydai concerned himself with the security of the group, particularly with regard to an undercover officer infiltrating the group and another man who he was later happy with after claiming to have "done a test on him" (R v Benbrika & Ors., 2009, p.36).

Further security, or anti-surveillance, tactics were described in court, including individual members being told details of the group's activities and plans on a "need to know" basis, warnings of speaking to people about the group and Benbrika wanting to keep certain members secret from others: "... the more there are brothers who don't know each other the better" (R v Benbrika, 2007, p.2). According to Benbrika this would decrease the chance of a group member revealing (or being forced to reveal) information that might be detrimental to the whole group. While such tactics could potentially create suspicion between members, Benbrika's group showed group

cohesion through referring to themselves as Mujahideen. Further, they engaged in a system of pledging loyalty (or giving the 'bayat') to Benbrika. This is likely to have served to increase Benbrika's control over group members. Unfortunately, little is known about the connections of Lodhi and Khazaal to others so no comment can be made regarding the structure of, or communication among, any links. However, the Sydney group were using coded texts and mobile telephones registered in fake name to avoid detection (R. v. Elomar & Ors, 2010).

Literature and internet. With the Internet, extremist views and recruitment speeches do not now have to be experienced in person. Materials that support jihad, such as audio, video and articles are all accessible from home over the internet, as are materials that educate in methods to carry out acts of terrorism. There was evidence that 12 of the 21 men in this sample had accessed online, and held in their possession, material that supported and incited Jihad. Fourteen of the men also had material from the internet that provided some sort of terrorist advice or training. Eight possessed extremely violent terrorism media, including videos of beheading non-Muslims. In the case of the Benbrika group, such material was shared between some group members, sometimes formally through Benbrika's instruction and sometimes less formally, with one member asking another for some "good sites" and in return getting advice as to how to access jihadi websites. On another occasion the same member gave directions to a website to gain access to terrorist videos. Similar sharing of material also occurred between the members of the Sydney cell.

Training/capability. Accessing information via the internet can increase knowledge and capabilities for terrorism, in terms of providing ideas and skills but also in terms of increasing psychological capability by reducing sensitivity to violence. Somewhat more 'formal' training was also alleged to take place through

group outings within Australia. This was alleged in the Benbrika group, where members went on several trips to remote regions where evidence was found of weapons having been fired and also experiments with devices that may have been attempts at manufacturing a detonator device. Indeed, in the case of Benbrika and Ors. the court accepted that Benbrika thought that training was important for his followers, stating that,

> Benbrika expressed the view that training in the use of knives for attacking the *kuffar* was necessary. He demonstrated to an unidentified male how a knife could be used to attack and kill a person, saying "You have to learn it" (R v Benbrika, 2009, p12).

Similarly, five members of the Sydney cell went on group trips within New South Wales, both informally as 'hunting trips' and also to attend a more formal terrorist training camp. In addition, some sample members had, or were alleged to have had, formal training, either in the military (Roche) or by terrorists overseas (n=5), for example in Afghanistan or Pakistan.

Overall, eleven of the 21 men made overseas trips, visiting countries including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Lebannon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Malaysia and Indonesia. Evidence is provided that some of these trips involved meeting with terrorists and related organisations. Indeed, Roche had links to terrorists in Australia and overseas, particularly as part of JI and Al Qaida, while Lodhi was linked to the convicted terrorist Willie Brigitte and also people and organisations in Pakistan that were linked to terrorism.

However, while the above indicates some evidence of attempts to increase capability for terrorism, generally none of the convicted 21 were accepted to be particularly advanced in planning an attack. For example, in R v Lodhi (2006), Judge

Whealy concluded that Lodhi had neither selected a target for attack nor decided on who would carry out the attack and how. Similarly, in the case of Benbrika et al., Judge Bongiorno concluded that, for sentencing purposes, the group had not selected a target or acquired any materials with which to carry out an attack. According to Judge Bongiorno,

> His (Benbrika's) leadership may have been less than what would have been expected had he been a trained soldier or even a trained terrorist, and his and his followers' capacity to carry out a terrorist act may have been less than professional (R v Benbrika, 2009, p.20).

The Sydney cell members, however, were considered to be in a slightly more advanced stage of planning and had accessed large amount of weapons and ammunition as well as materials that were believed to be associated with bomb-making attempts. However, these attempts were described "limited", "amateurish" and "ineffective" (R v Touma, 2008) and activities to acquire materials were far from expert. For example, Sharrouf was caught shoplifting a large number quantity of batteries and several clocks. Nonetheless, as judge Bongiorno states, lack of expertise does not necessarily pose any less of a threat,

> overseas experience of terrorist activity with which we are all unfortunately now very familiar does not suggest that terrorism is the preserve of highly skilled or highly effective operatives. Indeed, it might be said that terrorist acts as they have been experienced in modern times are often carried out by amateurs whose principal attribute has not been skill but rather a zealous or fanatical belief in some ideology or other which seeks to promote itself by the use of violence (R v Benbrika, 2009, p.21).

In the cases of Jack Roche and Shane Kent, however, evidence was provided for a degree of de-radicalization, or loss of commitment to terrorist activity. Showing that movement through the stages is not uni-directional, or unstoppable. Roche is reported to have left JI after disagreements with members and made several attempts to contact Australian authorities, including the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO). Indeed, the court accepted that Roche had remained inactive in the community for two years prior to his arrest and incarceration and that "there was no prospect that the offender would be involved in anything of this kind again" (R v Roche [2005] WASCA 4, p.10). To a lesser extent, the supreme court accepted that Shane Kent may have become less enthusiastic about the Benbrika group, accepting that "whilst Kent remained a member of the organisation throughout the whole of the indictment period, his fervour probably waxed and waned from time to time, depending upon his circumstances" (R v Kent [2009] VSC 375, p5).

Discussion

The sample used in the present study were all convicted under Australian law. There is much contention around anti-terrorism law and whether such laws are 'over-zealous' in their applications (see for example, McSherry, 2005) however, the results of the present study suggest a great deal of similarities between this Australian sample and others overseas. In terms of background, the sample generally supported Silber and Bhatt's (2007) observation that home-grown terrorists are "unremarkable" and "ordinary". Camins (2003) previously drew comparisons between reported characteristics of Palestinian suicide terrorists and the profile of the typical violent criminal in Australia: mostly male, late teens to early 20s, uneducated, unemployed, and unmarried. Indeed, this profile is similar to that which supported social control/bond theories of criminality (Reckless, 1961; Hirschi, 1969). In contrast, the

current sample members are somewhat older than this profile, with a mean age in their late 20's. There is, though, a marked difference between the ages of those members who were followers of Benbrika (all under age 27 years old) and the remaining sample (all over 30 years old).

Further, whilst there were differences among the current sample members in terms of education and employment, the majority of the sample had family in Australia, were married, many had children and most had some form of employment. Indeed, unlike Camins' (2003) Palestinian terrorists, the sample show a great deal of evidence of attachments to society rather than detachment from it. However, isolation increased as radicalisation progressed and intensified. Thus, isolation does appear to have facilitated radicalisation in the Australian sample.

There may, however, be an important difference between attachments to community and attachments to society. While the individuals may show family and community attachments, they were not necessarily integrated into wider Australian society, but living in Muslim communities. While such communities can undoubtedly provide support networks and a sense of common identity, immersion within them may decrease the likelihood of experiencing cultural diversity and developing wider societal bonds or a National identity. It may also present identity difficulties, as Innes, et al, (2007) suggest, due to a perceived separation between an Australian and a Muslim identity, particularly for those second generation immigrants in the current sample. The sense of inter-group difference, which provides vulnerability to the extremist message, may be decreased through the ability to identify as both Muslim and Australian, and experience positive relations with non-Muslims. Furthermore, the individuals showed increasing separation from the mainstream Muslim community, meaning that these support systems became more remote and less influential.

Less than half the sample showed any evidence of criminal history and/or addiction issues. However, in those individuals who did, this may indicate a propensity for crime or detachment with society values that may accord with extremism (for example, Atik). Although somewhat speculative, such individuals may be looking for purpose, acceptance, and self-esteem enhancement that can come through both justification for their criminal lifestyle as well as through social comparison. Thus, such individuals may be particularly vulnerable to certain charismatic individuals who support ideas that are consistent with these needs (e.g., attitudes that support the use of violence, justification of that use of violence, and superiority over others – e.g. the Kuffar).

However, for others, negative triggers provoked the search for a positive change in lifestyle, which led to religious conversion (for example, Roche). Indeed, finding religion is not a new concept in desistance research, although it is not widely researched. Often, the individual turns to religion in the face of crisis. For example, Maruna, Wilson and Curran (2006) explored religious conversion among prisoners. The triggering events experienced by the present sample were not all necessarily negative, though, as Silber & Bhatt (2007) and Innes, et al. (2007) seem to suggest when discussing triggers, or signal events, respectively. For example, Lodhi's marriage is said to have caused him to feel the need to be better focused and more structured, leading him to pursue religion more purposefully than he had previously.

However, in such cases the new religion may be difficult to equate with how the person has been living their life and the values that they have previously held. This may create dissonance that the individual has to resolve. One way of resolving issues may be to believe that the religion supports their behaviour as long as it was directed towards deserving individuals, thus making them particularly vulnerable to the

extremist message. Further, the previous lack of religious instruction or practise is likely to leave individuals reliant upon readings and interpretation of religious texts by individuals who are believed to be authorities. While many Muslim clerics in the West may teach 'moderate' versions of Islam, it is clear that radical clerics have a role to play, particularly in the indoctrination stage. Importantly, such radical clerics may themselves have limited knowledge or understanding of the religion, or have fashioned their own interpretation. Benbrika, for example, was a self-taught cleric, who did not attend religious classes himself.

There is strong evidence for the use of neutralizations (Sykes & Matza, 1957), largely to legitimise the ideas of violent jihad. The use of neutralisations has largely been discussed by researchers in terms of the post-hoc benefits that they provide the user with, in terms of explaining and justifying past behaviour in order to reduce present negative feelings (from the self or others) (Maruna & Copes, 2005). However, the present examples, particularly in the recorded speech of the Benbrika group, offer examples of neutralizations being used for persuasive purposes regarding future behaviour and indoctrination of ideas and attitudes. Al-Khattar (2003) discusses Sykes and Matza's (1957) neutralizations in the context of both religious and non-religious terrorism and argues the relevance of all five techniques: Denial of responsibility; denial of injury; denial of victim; condemnation of the condemners; appeal to higher loyalties. The most common form of justification used by the present sample members involved the idea of retaliation for previous wrongs. Thus, non-Muslim's were seen as deserving of jihad. This is what Sykes and Matza (1957) described as "denial of victim". There is also clear application of Sykes and Matza's (1957) category of "appeal to higher loyalties", stating that jihad is an obligation of their religion.

Such neutralizations allow the more active participation in furtherance of the goal of violent jihad. However, this was limited in the present sample, with none of the individuals actually carrying out any form of terrorist attack. Thus, while the speech showed evidence of an internalisation of the jihad mission, and indicated some form of intent to follow this, the actual actions and capability to carry anything through were limited. It is difficult to determine the cause of this: whether the limits in capacity were due to the individuals or groups themselves, or the success of law enforcement preventative measures. It is evident that, with the exception of Jack Roche and, possibly Lodhi, the majority of the sample members did not seem (on the basis of the available information) to be formally embedded into any global terrorist networks that provided support or resources. On the other hand, though, the individuals all attracted the attention of law enforcement operations. Indeed Operation Pendennis involved multiple agencies who tracked the Benbrika group for 16 months, using covert surveillance and undercover operatives. As outlined earlier in the words of Judge Bongiorno, even those with limited knowledge or training can still potentially create a serious and deadly threat.

With regard to the specific models of radicalisation of Innes, et al. (2007) and Silber and Bhatt (2007), the present sample shows similarities to, and therefore evidence for, many of the inherent concepts. Xxx implicationsxxx For example, themes relating to all four of Silber and Bhatt's stages were identified, although the data did not allow for the stage process to be tested explicitly as the sequential ordering of circumstances for the sample individuals could not always be demonstrated. The sample did seem to follow a general trend of increasing indoctrination into the extremist ideology and isolation from community and western influences. However, some of the cell members involved in Operation Pendennis

(both Melbourne and Sydney) were still asking for ideological clarification relating to explanations of legitimisation of terrorist attacks and martyrdom while they were also involved in behaviour that could be said to be increasing capability. Thus, they were displaying jihadization (stage four) behaviour while perhaps not fully indoctrinated (stage three). The majority of Innes, et al.'s (2007) model concepts were present in the sample, although some (such as ideology, indoctrination and group dynamics) were more prominent than others. For example, while some evidence of inter- and intra-community separation was evident, such as Muslim/Australian identity issues and increased isolation, there was little evidence of beliefs of declining social control.

Moreover, it is important to mention that Roche's severance from JI and cessation of terrorist-related activity indicates possibilities of de-radicalisation. Roche's case suggests that not only can the process be halted but it can be reversed. That is, Roche was committed to carrying out terrorist activities but then ceased this activity. While Silber and Bhatt (2007) and Innes, et al. (2007) both suggest that progression through the process is not inevitable, neither discuss how their models may relate to de-radicalisation. For Silber and Bhatt's model, de-radicalisation may suggest reverse passage through the stages. Roche, it seems, was in the Jihadization stage but then lapsed back into the indoctrination stage, still holding his beliefs but without intent to act on them. In terms of the Innes, et al. (2007) model, de-radicalisation may occur where circumstances are no longer in alignment. That is, where at least one of the necessary conditions is no longer present. For Roche, it is difficult to ascertain exactly which condition this might be. Perhaps, disagreements with JI likely removed the support of like-minded individuals, which may indicate removal of the differential association catalyst or less strong a pull of group dynamics. These concepts are difficult to unpick and separate.

In summary, then, the present Australian sample, while small, shows similarities with the findings of studies of home-grown terrorists overseas, therefore, counter-terrorism measures being developed overseas may likely apply to the Australian context. Innes, et al, (2007) conclude that "Much of what is vital in propelling processes of radicalisation lies beyond the normal remit of the police" (Innes, et al., 2007, p. 62). Thus, there may be several useful approaches – engagement of the community, a multi-agency approach to the problem, or a re-framing of the police remit. Indeed, as raised by Mr. Angus Campbell of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet at the Security In Government Conference in 2007, while governments can play their part, it is ultimately the friends and families of those at risk of radicalisation that are likely to be best placed to identify and prevent the radicalisation process from escalating. Innes, (2006) suggests utilising an intelligence feed from the community using neighbourhood policing. Pickering, McCulloch and Wright-Neville (2008) discuss such an approach, with reference to the Australian context, and emphasise the importance of community trust in the police and the difficulties of achieving this in a counter-terrorism context. Such difficulties include the paradox of high visibility policing being perceived as reassurance vs persecution/discrimination. Further, Pickering, et al. (2008) suggest that, to build community trust in the police, community engagement must operate under a philosophy of two-way information sharing, such that communities ultimately receive knowledge regarding, or can influence how, such information passed to police is used. This may prove difficult in counter-terrorism as too much transparency in these processes can lead to effective counter measures.

Conclusion

The present paper has provided a picture of 21 individuals currently convicted under Australian anti-terrorism law. As such is offers a first step towards the systematic documentation of violent extremism in Australia. In turn, defining and explaining why people become violent extremists in the Australian context is the first step in developing strategies that encourage more positive engagement with people susceptible to an extremist agenda.

Endnotes

[1] Kissane, K. (2008, September, 16). Benbrika and five followers found guilty on terrorism charges. *The Age*, pp. 1, 7.

[2] Kissane, K. (2008, September 16). Ordeal takes its toll on shaken sheikh. *The Age*, p. 6.

[3] Squires, N. (2004, June 2). British Muslim is jailed for al-Qa'eda embassy bomb plot. *Telegraph*. Retrieved March 4, 2009 from

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/australiaandthepacific/australia/1463455/British-Muslim-is-jailed-for-al-Qaeda-embassy-bomb-plot.html

[4] Kohlmann, E. (2008). The Case of Belal Khazaal and "Essential Provisions in the Rules of Jihad", retrieved November 13, 2008, from

http://counterterrorismblog.org/2008/09/the_case_of_belal_khazaal_and.php

[5] See endnote 4.

[6] See endnote 5.

[7] Bice, K. and Moor, K. (2008, September 16). Aussie jihad to kill 1000. The Daily Telegraph, p. 5.

[8] McKenzie, N. (2005, August 4). Suspect claims ASIO surveillance unjust. *The 7.30 report*, Australian Broadcasting Corporation. retrieved January 15, 2009, from http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2005/s1430601.htm

[9] See endnote 5.

References

Al-Khattar, A.M. (2003). Religion and terrorism: an inter-faith perspective. Westport: Praeger Publishers.

Australian Human Rights Commission (2009). New projects set to build bridges between police and Muslim communities. Media release retrieved June 29, 2009, from

http://www.hreoc.gov.au/about/media/media_releases/2009/25_09.html

Azzam, M. (2007). Radicalization of Muslim Communities in Europe. *Brown Journal of World Affairs, 13*(2), 123-138.

Bakker, E. (2006). *Jihadi terrorists in Europe: their characteristics and the circumstances in which they joined the jihad: an exploratory study*. Clingendael: Netherlands Institute of International Relations.

Bergin, A., Jones, D. M., & Ungerer, C. (2007). *Beyond belief: Islamism, radicalisation and the counter-terrorism* (No. 37): Australian Strategic Policy Institute

Camins, E. (2003). War against Terrorism: Fighting the Military Battle, Losing the Psychological War. *Current Issues in Criminal Justice, 15*(2), 95 -113.

Campbell, A. (2007). *Panel Discussion: Home Grown Terrorism in Australia: the Way Forward*. Mr Angus Campbell, First Assistant Secretary, National Security Division, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet – Security In Government Conference, Canberra, 5 December 2007. Retrieved June 26,

2009, from

http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(756EDFD270AD704EF00C15CF396D6111)~SIG+2007+-+Panel+Discussion+-+Mr+Campbell.pdf/$file/SIG+2007+-+Panel+Discussion+-+Mr+Campbell.pdf

Cole, J., & Cole, B. (2009). *Martyrdom: Radicalization and Terrorism Amongst British Muslims.* London: Pennant Books.

Davis, P.K. & Cragin, K. (2009). *Social science for counterterrorism : putting the pieces together.* Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation.

Grimland, M., Apter, A., & Kerkhof, A. (2006). The Phenomenon of Suicide Bombing: A Review of Psychological and Nonpsychological Factors. *Crisis: The Journal of Crisis Intervention and Suicide Prevention, 27*(3), 107-118.

Hirschi, T. (1969). *Causes of Delinquency.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Innes, M., Abbott, L., Lowe, T., & Roberts, C. (2007). *Hearts and Minds and Eyes and Ears: Reducing Radicalisation Risks Through Reassurance Orientated Policing.* Cardiff, Wales: Universities Police Science Institute.

Krueger, A. B. (2008). What makes a homegrown terrorist? Human capital and participation in domestic Islamic terrorist groups in the U.S.A. *Economics Letters, 101*(3), 293-296.

Maruna, S., & Copes, H. (2005). Excuses, Excuses: What Have We Learned from Five Decades of Neutralization Research? *Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, 32*, 221-320.

Maruna, S., Wilson, L., & Curran, K. (2006). Why God Is Often Found Behind Bars: Prison Conversions and the Crisis of Self-Narrative. *Research in Human Development, 3*(2 & 3), 61–184.

McClelland, R. (2008). Press Conference, Blue Room, Parliament House, Canberra,

15 September 2008. Retrieved March 24, 2009, from

http://www.attorneygeneral.gov.au/www/ministers/robertmc.nsf/Page/Transcri

pts_2008_15September2008-PressConferenceParliamentHouse

Ministerial Council on Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2007). *A National*

Action Plan to Build on Social Cohesion, Harmony and Security. Retrieved

June 26, 2009 from http://www.immi.gov.au/living-in-australia/a-diverse-

australia/national-action-plan/_attach/National-Action-Plan-2007.pdf

Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (2006). Violent Jihad in the

Netherlands: Current trends in the Islamist terrorist threat. The Hague,

Netherlands: General Intelligence and Security Service.

Pickering, S., McCulloch, J., & Wright-Neville, D. (2008). Counter-terrorism

policing: towards social cohesion. *Crime, Law and Social Change, 50*(1), 91-

109.

R v Benbrika and Ors., VSC 21 (2009).

R v Benbrika (Ruling No. 8), VSC 404 (2007).

R v Lodhi, NSWSC 691 (2006).

R v. Khazal, NSWSC 548 (2004).

R v Atik, VSC 299 (2007).

R v Roche, WASCA 4 (2005).

R (C'Wealth) v Sharrouf. NSWSC 1002 (2009).

R (C'Wealth) v Touma. NSWSC 1475 92008).

Reckless, W. C. (1961). A New Theory of Delinquency and Crime. *Federal*

Probation, 25, 42–46.

Sageman, M. (2004). *Understanding terrorist networks*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Silber, M.D. & Bhatt, A. (2007). *Radicalization in the West: The Home Grown Threat.* NYPD: New York.

Silke, A. (2008). Holy Warriors: Exploring the Psychological Processes of Jihadi Radicalization. *European Journal of Criminology, 5*(1), 99-123.

Sykes, G, and Matza. D. (1957). Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of Delinquency. *American Sociological Review, 22*, 664–70.

Appendix: Sample members' convictions

R v Benbrika & Ors (R v Benbrika and ors [2009] VSC 21; R v Atik [2007] VSC 299)

On 15 and 16 September 2008 Benbrika and 6 others were found guilty of offences under the *Criminal Code Act 1995 as follows*:

Mr Abdul Nacer Benbrika: guilty of being a member of a terrorist organisation (s102.3(1)); directing the activities of a terrorist organisation (s102.2(1)); and possessing a thing connected with the preparation for a terrorist act (s101.4(1)).

Mr Aimen Joud: guilty of being a member of a terrorist organisation (s102.3(1)); attempting to make funds available to a terrorist organisation (ss 11.1(1) and 102.6(1)); intentionally providing resources to a terrorist organisation (s102.7(1)); and two counts of knowingly possessing a thing connected a terrorist act (s101.4(1)).

Mr Abdullah Merhi: guilty of being a member of a terrorist organisation (s 102.3(1)).

Mr Ahmad Raad: guilty of being a member of a terrorist organisation (s 102.3(1)); attempting to make funds available to a terrorist organisation (ss 11.1(1) and 102.6(1)); and providing resources to a terrorist organisation (s102.7(1)).

Mr Ezzit Raad: guilty of being a member of a terrorist organisation (s 102.3(1)); and attempting to provide funds to a terrorist organisation (ss 11.1(1) and 102.6(1)).

Mr Fadal Sayadi: guilty of being a member of a terrorist organisation (s102.3(1)); and intentionally providing resources to a terrorist organisation (s102.7(1))

Mr Amer Haddara: guilty of being member of a terrorist organisation (s 102.3(1)).

On 4 July 2007 **Mr Izzydeen Atik** pled guilty to being a member of a terrorist organisation (s102.3(1)) and intentionally providing resources or support to a terrorist organisation (s102.7(1)).

Belal Khazaal (R v. KHAZAL [2004] NSWSC 548)

On 10 September 2008 Mr Khazaal was found guilty under section 101.5 of the *Criminal Code Act 1995* of making a document, namely, a book, connected with preparation for, the engagement of a person in, or assistance in a terrorist act, knowing of that connection. The document was entitled '*Provisions on the Rules of Jihad - short judicial rulings and organisational instructions for fighters and mujahideen against infidels*'.

Faheem Lodhi (R v Lodhi [2006] NSWSC 691)

On 19 June 2006 Mr Lodhi was convicted of three terrorism offences under Part 5.3 of the *Criminal Code Act 1995:* collected documents, namely two maps of the Australian electricity supply system, which were connected with preparation for a terrorist act, namely bombing part of the system, knowing the said connection; intentionally did an act in preparation for a terrorist act, namely he sought information concerning the availability of materials capable of being used for the manufacture of explosives or incendiary devices; possessed a document containing information concerning the ingredients for and the method of manufacture of poisons, explosives, detonators and incendiary devices connected with the preparation for a terrorist act, knowing the said connection.

Jack Roche (R v ROCHE [2005] WASCA 4)

In June 2003 Mr Roche was sentenced to 9 years imprisonment for conspiracy to commit the offence provided by the *Crimes (Internationally Protected Persons) Act 1976* (Cth), s 8(3C)(a). This was the offence of intentionally destroying or damaging by means of explosive, official premises of internationally protected persons - the Israeli Embassy in Canberra - with intent to endanger the lives of internationally protected persons by that damage or destruction.

Sydney Cell (R v Touma [2008] NSWSC 1475; R v Mulahalilovic [2009] NSWSC 1010; R v Sharrouf [2009] NSWSC 1002; R v Elomar and Ors.INSERT REF

INSERT DETAILS OF CONVICTIONS

Table 1: Number of newspaper and law reports gathered for each case analysis.

Case	Number of Newspaper reports	Number of Law reports	Total
Roche	29	1	30
Lodhi	9	20	29
Khazaal	16	3	19
Sydney cell	26	10	36
Benbrika & Others	89	37	126
Total	169	71	240

Table 2: Age at incident

Age (yrs)	Frequency	Percent
20	1	4.8
21	2	9.5
22	1	4.8
23	1	4.8
24	1	4.8
25	3	14.3
26	1	4.8
28	3	14.3
29	1	4.8
32	1	4.8
33	2	9.5
36	1	4.8
40	1	4.8
45	1	4.8
47	1	4.8
Total	21	100.0