

## **The Glorious Sovereign:**

### **Thomas Hobbes on Leadership and International Relations**

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Thomas Hobbes lived to the ripe old age of 91, an impressive achievement for one who lived in the most dangerous of times.<sup>1</sup> His long and eventful life coincided with one of the most turbulent and perilous periods in English history, marked by the execution of Charles I, the Civil Wars, the Commonwealth and the Protectorate, and finally the Stuart Restoration. It is perhaps this fact, above all, that explains Hobbes' abiding interest in securing the stability of the state, even to the neglect of international relations. From his very first writing, a translation of Thucydides' *Peloponnesian Wars*, to his major political works, such as *Elements of Law* (1640), *De Cive* (1642) and *Leviathan* (1651), to the posthumously published *Dialogues* (1681) and *Behemoth* (1682), his overriding concern was overcoming civil war and internal instability. This view gains some support from Hobbes himself. At the very end of his most well known work, *Leviathan*, Hobbes states that having completed his "Discourse of Civill and Ecclesiasticall Government, occassioned by the disorders of the present time," he will "return to my interrupted Speculation of Bodies Naturall; wherein (if God give me health to finish it,) I hope the Novelty will as much please, as in the Doctrine of this Artificiall Body it useth to offend."<sup>2</sup> From this account, it seems that Hobbes is primarily a political philosopher of domestic politics and only incidentally and indirectly a student of international relations.<sup>3</sup> We see this confirmed by Hobbes' claimed "Novelty" for his actions, boasting that he is the first to have founded politics on solid ground, the first political scientist.<sup>4</sup> He observes that just as "Time and Industry" produce new knowledge regarding the art of architecture, his new-found "Principles of Reason" set forth in "this discourse" will make the constitution of Commonwealths "(excepting by externall violence) everlasting."<sup>5</sup>

Hobbes literally brackets or excludes the problem of ‘Externall violence’ or more generally international politics as beyond the reach of his new political science. From this perspective Hobbes would perhaps be amused by the fact that he is considered a seminal theorist of international relations.

Such an historical approach to Hobbes’ scholarship may well explain his apparent silence regarding international relations, but in doing so it raises a series of profound questions. Is it possible to demarcate international and domestic politics in the way Hobbes seems to suggest? Does Hobbes’ “new science” nevertheless have an implicit teaching on international relations? What implications does such a teaching have for Hobbes’ claims that his discoveries promise an “everlasting” Commonwealth? In this chapter I argue that Hobbes’ reticence regarding international relations is not a minor omission; his relative neglect of international politics undermines significantly his new political science.<sup>6</sup> By concentrating on the ‘sovereign’, who sits at the intersection of the domestic and international, I suggest that Hobbes’ solution to political instability in the state—the institution of the glorious sovereign—exposes the state to greater international instability and therefore ultimately undermines the Hobbesian promise of an everlasting commonwealth. By his own measure, the Hobbesian sovereign will be a glory-seeker, and as such, will pose in the international community (and consequently for the Hobbesian state) the same problems and dangers that Hobbes discerned in the glory-seeker in the state of nature. Thus the problem of the glorious sovereign is not only a problem for international relations, it poses a major challenge to Hobbesian political thought by revealing the ambiguous place of judgment, prudence and statesmanship in Hobbes’ science, radically questioning its scientific, mathematical and geometrical presuppositions.<sup>7</sup>

In the first part of the chapter I outline Hobbes’ views on international relations, derived by implication and analogy from his writings on the constitution of the state. I then

examine Hobbes' understanding of the passions, and show how his diagnosis of the state of nature and his proposed solution of awesome fear institutionalizes a proud, glory-lover as sovereign. In the final part I explore the extent to which such a glorious sovereign undermines Hobbes' aspirations for a peaceful and commodious commonwealth.

### ***Hobbes and the Law of Nations***

In the *Leviathan*, near the end of chapter XXX, "*Of the OFFICE of the Sovereign Representative*," Hobbes explains why he does not discuss international politics extensively.

The passage deserves quoting at length:

Concerning the Offices of one Sovereign to another, which are comprehended in that Law, which is commonly called the *Law of Nations*, I need not say any thing in this place; because the Law of Nations, and the Law of Nature, is the same thing. And every Sovereign hath the same Right, in procuring the safety of his People, that any particular man can have, in procuring the safety of his own Body. And the same Law, that dictateth to men that have no Civil Government, what they ought to do, and what to avoyd in regard of one another, dictateth the same to Common-wealths, that is, to the Consciences of Sovereign Princes, and Sovereign Assemblies; there being no Court of Naturall Justice, but in Conscience onely; where not Man, but God raigneth.<sup>8</sup>

This deceptively simple account suggests that international politics is identical to Hobbes' well-known depiction of the laws of nature that apply where there is no "Civil Government," that is, in the state of nature.<sup>9</sup> For Hobbes the Law of Nature, which is not in fact a law but a "precept, or generall rule," contains the "Fundamentall Law of Nature," which is "*to seek Peace, and follow it*," and the Right of Nature, which is, "*By all means we can, to defend our*

*selves.*”<sup>10</sup> Where there is no common power to keep all in awe, the nature of man yields “three principall causes of quarrell”—Competition, Diffidence and Glory—which issue in a condition of “warre, as is of every man, against every man.”<sup>11</sup> In such a state, “every man has a Right to every thing; even to one anothers body.”<sup>12</sup> By analogy, therefore, it would seem that international relations, being identical to the state of nature, has all those aspects of the state of nature Hobbes depicts in chapter XIII, “*Of the NATURAL CONDITION of Mankind, as concerning their Felicity, and Misery*”: for example, it is a state of insecurity and animosity that requires self-reliance; because there is no common power it is lawless, and therefore “Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice have there no place”; as a state of war, the “two Cardinall vertues” of war, Force, and Fraud predominate.

Hobbes is aware, of course, that there are limits to such an analogical approach. As he notes, the posture of war between sovereigns, requiring constant vigilance and spying, does not lead to the inconveniences of war for individuals because sovereigns, in providing a common power within each state, uphold the “Industry of their Subjects.” Thus international politics as a state of nature allows for, or is consistent with, the possibility of industry, cultivation of the earth, navigation, commodious buildings and the general advancement in arts and letters.<sup>13</sup> Nevertheless he seems to confirm the inherent intractableness, and therefore fundamental dangerousness, of international politics.

This ‘minimalist’ understanding of Hobbesian international relations has been especially influential in the modern ‘realist’ schools of international relations.<sup>14</sup> Its limited scope has been challenged, however, by scholars who suggest that Hobbes’ equation of international politics with the state of nature in fact yields a more extensive range of duties and responsibilities for sovereigns. Though not amounting to a comprehensive Kantian law of nations, such an understanding of Hobbesian international relations is much richer than the simple minimalism of realism.<sup>15</sup>

This ‘maximalist’ Hobbesian internationalism has as its starting point an appreciation of the greater efficacy of the laws of nature in international relations.<sup>16</sup> The analogy between the individual’s place in the state of nature, and the sovereign’s in international relations does not hold in certain important respects. Though sovereigns must assure their own safety and the security of the state, and therefore wars waged for this purpose are just because there is no other recourse,<sup>17</sup> sovereign states are more secure than individuals in the state of nature (for example, they are not all equal; they need not sleep; they are not mortal). Moreover, because sovereigns uphold the “Industry of their Subjects,” alleviating their misery, those passions that incline individuals in the state of nature to peace are less forceful in international relations.<sup>18</sup> But the absence of a common power in the international realm also means a greater freedom in international relations, so that the laws of nature need not be silent. As Johnson puts it, “peace will not be as urgent a priority as it is in relations among individuals, but the need to violate the laws of nature will also not be as urgent.”<sup>19</sup>

Hobbes’ claim, as we noted above, is that the Law of Nations is identical to Law of Nature. The fundamental law of nature, “*That every man, ought to endeavour Peace, as farre as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of Warre,*” yields, according to Hobbes, nineteen other laws.<sup>20</sup> One of the most important of these is the Second Law of nature, a willingness, if others are also willing, to lay down one’s right to all things. The other laws of nature include, justice, gratitude, and compleasance.<sup>21</sup> These laws, the “true Morall Philosophy,” are eternal and always bind in conscience, but not in practice if there is no security. Each sovereign will therefore have to evaluate the extent to which they can safely be followed. Nevertheless it is possible to extrapolate from Hobbes’ account an international realm shaped by such laws of nature. For example, sovereigns and states may legitimately seek peace whenever possible simply because peaceful solutions are more expeditious and less dangerous than recourse to

war. Thus covenants, contract or agreements between states may be entered into, in the spirit of gratitude and accommodation, even if their breach is not technically unjust. Some such arrangements, for example providing for ambassadorial immunity, is in the interest of all sovereigns, allowing free channels of communication between sovereigns and states.<sup>22</sup> In any case, because for Hobbes coerced covenants—covenants entered into out of fear—are binding, international relations may be defined by valid contracts between stronger and weaker nations, enforced with the threat of war.<sup>23</sup> Though war is always available to the sovereign, it should always be for the security and safety of the state, and not the desire to avenge a past wrong, or out of contumely, arrogance or pride. Indeed, these principles dictate the way wars should be conducted, limiting as much as possible unnecessary cruelty in the persecution of war. It is tempting to venture that this complex of bilateral and multilateral covenants, treaties, obligations and arrangements may in one sense be said to provide the foundations for an international community that ultimately replicates the Hobbesian sovereignty on the level of world government. Does Hobbes anticipate Kantian ‘perpetual peace’? The simple answer is no. As noted, the incommodities of international relations are less bleak and severe than the forbidding state of nature experienced by individuals, making the logic of an international Leviathan less compelling. Moreover, though clearly in favour of international peace, Hobbes’ conception of sovereignty—the core premise or presupposition of which is that sovereignty can never be divided or shared<sup>24</sup>—means that international peace secured and enforced by a world government (or confederation of republics) would deny the sovereignty of each state. If such an arrangement were to be stable or effective, Hobbes would see it as nothing more than a very large commonwealth or empire.<sup>25</sup>

### *Character of the Sovereign*

Both minimalist and maximalist interpretations of Hobbesian international relations reveal the crucial role of the sovereign, in pursuing peace to the extent that it does not jeopardise security, while encouraging domestic tranquillity and therefore prosperity. Hobbes' 'new science,' it seems, depends fundamentally on the prudence and judgment of political leaders.<sup>26</sup> But Hobbes seems ambiguous on this point. On the one hand he is not concerned with individuals as such but institutions, so that once his institutional arrangements are in place, anyone can be the sovereign.<sup>27</sup> The Sovereign is the "Artificiall *Soul*," of that "Artificiall Man," "that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMON-WEALTH, or STATE."<sup>28</sup> As he states in his dedication to Francis Godolphin, "I speak not of the men, but (in the Abstract) of the Seat of Power, (like to those simple and unpartiall creatures in the Roman Capitol, that with their noyse defended those within it, not because they were they, but there)."<sup>29</sup> Where you are, it seems, is more important than who you are for Hobbes.<sup>30</sup> This view is supported by his debunking of the Aristotelian understanding that some should command because they are more prudent and wise. Hobbes' response is that "For there are very few so foolish, that had not rather governe themselves, than be governed by others."<sup>31</sup> Natural equality means equality in prudence: "A plain husband-man is more Prudent in affaires of his own house, then a Privy Counsellor in the affaires of another man."<sup>32</sup> Perhaps nowhere else is this made clearer than in Hobbes' account of the "Generation of a Commonwealth," which is silent as to the character of the sovereign, only requiring the reduction of many "Wills" unto one "Will."<sup>33</sup>

Yet this view is countered in Hobbes by the implicit acknowledgment of the crucial role of the specific character and virtues of the sovereign. In his dedication to Godolphin, Hobbes accepts that Sidney Godolphin had many virtues, "not as acquired by necessity, or affected upon occasion, but inhaerent, and shining in a generous constitution of his nature."<sup>34</sup> Individuals, it seems, will differ regarding their skills, aptitude and virtues. The political

importance of this fact becomes evident when we see that Hobbes concedes an important difference between the *justice* of laws, and their *goodness*. Though the law of nature is the foundation of justice, just or unjust exist only once a commonwealth is constituted with a sovereign who can compel individuals to perform their covenants. All laws made by authorized sovereigns are thereby, by definition, just. But not all just laws are good laws—as Hobbes says, “A good Law is that, which is *Needfull*, for the *Good of the People*, and withall *Perspicuous*.”<sup>35</sup> Though not bound by laws strictly understood, because there are none to enforce them, it is in the sovereign’s interest to yield to natural laws, or right reason. Consequently it is possible to judge the reasonableness of a sovereign’s actions, even if we cannot question or challenge its justice.<sup>36</sup> Thus the protreptic ambitions of the *Leviathan* and Hobbes’ other works, seeking to educate sovereigns (and subjects) in what constitutes *reasonable* action.<sup>37</sup> We can see this educative aspect especially in the extensive discussion of the sovereign’s rights and duties in the second part, “Of Commonwealth,” of the *Leviathan*.<sup>38</sup> In spite of these reflections, however, there is no clear statement from Hobbes that most people are incapable of gaining such an education and therefore fulfilling such an office. Indeed, he suggests that his instructions are much easier and more accessible than the complex and contradictory religious instructions most have received.<sup>39</sup> It would seem, then, that ‘who’ the sovereign is may not actually matter, given proper Hobbesian instruction. But is everyone in fact equally receptive to Hobbes’ Euclidean rhetoric? In one important respect it would seem not. Of the three causes of war in the state of nature, pride seems to be least capable of listening to reason. Hence Hobbes’ consistent attempt to deflate the pretensions of glorying and pride.<sup>40</sup> Yet it is precisely the proud that Hobbes states will be sovereign.<sup>41</sup> Hobbes’ solution to the problem of war in the state of nature is the union of all those who consent to equality—who repudiate pride. Such a union requires the proud or the glory-seeker as sovereign who will superintend and keep overawed all parties to the contract. Even if this

solution to the problem of pride results in domestic stability, will it not exacerbate it internationally, given the challenge and opportunity international relations presents to the glory seeker? What will stop Hobbes' hope of a peaceful and industrious commonwealth from soon being transformed by ambitious sovereigns into Machiavellian armed camps, where martial *virtù* discharges the discordant humours in the republic. To evaluate the merits of this argument, it is necessary to understand Hobbes' own assessment of the passions and the way they shape politics.

### ***Diffident, Competitive, Glorious***

Hobbes is famous for denying the ancients' premise that human beings are "Political creatures" or lovers of some "greatest Good."<sup>42</sup> He rejects the classical understanding of types of human beings (and therefore regimes) defined by what they love or seek—for example, their love of honour, or wealth, or freedom—on the grounds that "there is no such *Finis ultimus*, (utmost ayme,) nor *Summum Bonum*, (greatest Good,) as is spoken of in the Books of the old Morall Philosophers."<sup>43</sup> Human motion, for Hobbes, is "Vitall" and "Voluntary." Voluntary motion is created by imagination, and results in "endeavour," which is felt as either desire or aversion.<sup>44</sup> Because there is no "greatest Good," "Felicity" lies in "a continuall progresse of the desire, from one object to another."<sup>45</sup> But the feeling of unlimited power does not last because new desires and aversions are always created by the "Senses and Imaginations."<sup>46</sup> As a result, Hobbes famously declares that "in the first place, I put for a generall inclination of all mankind, a perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after power, that ceaseth onely in Death."<sup>47</sup> Indeed, every good we seek—"Riches ... Knowledge ... Honour"—and every passion we feel "may be reduced to ... Desire of Power," since all things are to us "but severall sorts of Power."<sup>48</sup>

According to Hobbes, three types of human movement (and therefore human beings) predominate in nature: the Diffident; the Competitive; and the Glorious.<sup>49</sup> For all three the unavoidable reality of limited or scarce goods means that in pursuing their “Ends,” they are compelled to destroy or subdue one another.<sup>50</sup> Yet each type confronts this scarcity and struggle in its unique way. That is, while all people seek power, they have different judgments about how much power they need and about what confers the necessary power.

Diffidence, according to Hobbes’ definition, is “Constant *Despayre*,” that is, the constant opinion that you will not attain what you desire. While Hobbes says that there is a “general diffidence in mankind, and mutual fear one of another,” he also argues that some men are vainglorious and seek “superiority,” while others look only to equality.<sup>51</sup> This latter person—one of “those men who are moderate”—wants more power only because he “cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more.”<sup>52</sup> This lack of assurance is a form of “hopelessness” that makes the Diffident desperate, forcing them into enmity. The Diffident who is “reasonable,” according to Hobbes, will secure himself by “Anticipation”;

that is, by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can, so long, till he see no other power great enough to endanger him: And this is no more than his own conservation requireth, and is generally allowed.<sup>53</sup>

The disposition of the Diffident—a low estimation of one’s success in life, due to either constitution or experience—determines how he will wage war (reasonably; by anticipation) and when he will stop (“till he see no other power great enough to endanger him”).<sup>54</sup> As Hobbes notes, Diffidence as a “cause of quarrell” makes a man invade for “Safety” and use Violence to “defend” his body and possessions. Thus it seems that hopelessness of the

Diffident yields moderation—the Diffident will not ordinarily seek to conquer or master all other human beings. But he is forced to counter the Competitive.<sup>55</sup>

The Competitive does not simply desire, like the Diffident, to secure and defend his possessions. He wants more because he “cannot be content with a moderate power,” and so he goes beyond defending his immediate safety and uses violence to make himself “Masters of other mens persons, wives, children, and cattell.”<sup>56</sup> How can we explain this difference between the two types? Hobbes’ general answer is that the Competitive seeks mastery for “Gain.” The reason for this, it would seem, is that unlike the Diffident, the Competitive are hopeful that they have the power necessary to overcome other people.<sup>57</sup> They may hold this hope because their bodies are constituted differently, or because of their previous, generally successful experience, or a combination of both.<sup>58</sup> In any case, the Competitive, unlike the Diffident, go on the offensive not as a matter of pre-emptive defense but in order to gain power over others. In doing so, however, they never think that “Mastery” is anything other than a means to gain; they tend not to derive pleasure in exercising their power over other human beings except in the sense that it indicates, or is a measure, of gain. Consequently, their need to master is always constrained and circumscribed by material gain, and they can tolerate others who do not threaten that gain.

The limited character of the desire of the Competitive to conquer reveals the fundamental difference between the Competitive and the Glorious. According to Hobbes, glorying is a type of “Joy,” which is a pleasure of the mind.<sup>59</sup> More specifically, it is an “exultation of the mind” arising from “imagination of a mans own power and ability.”<sup>60</sup> While all people alike seek power, some people look for their power exclusively in glory, which explains why Hobbes states that the “Ends” of some is “conservation” and for others “delectation,” or “intense delight.”<sup>61</sup> Beyond the “short vehemence” of “carnall Pleasure” open to all people, intense delight can be found “in contemplating” one’s “own power in the

acts of conquest,” which produces great pleasure at the confirmation to oneself of one’s power.<sup>62</sup> Some glory-seeking is to be expected of all people because even the most “moderate” person naturally demands some value be placed on their person and finds joy in “comparing himself with other men” and judging himself “eminent.”<sup>63</sup> One piece of evidence for this view, Hobbes suggests, is the fact that everyone laughs, which is a rush of “*Sudden Glory*.”<sup>64</sup> Moreover, there is clearly a link between glory and the security we naturally want, since conquering others can make you secure.

But Hobbes also notes that glory-seekers often pursue glory “farther than their security requires,” creating the problem that some seek glory even at the risk of their lives.<sup>65</sup> For these people, glory becomes disengaged from its source in the pursuit of the power needed to preserve their vital motion. But why would anyone put the security of his person and property at risk for the sake of glory? Certainly, the characteristically human and intense nature of the pleasure of actual conquest must contribute to this forgetting or overreaching. Yet this is not the only reason. In Hobbes’ account of the person who invades for “Reputation,” we come to appreciate some of the major difficulties that inhere in the nature of acquiring and maintaining glory:

For every man looketh that his companion should value him, at the same rate he sets upon himselfe: And upon all signes of contempt, or undervaluing, naturally endeavours, as far as he dares (which amongst them that have no common power, to keep them quiet, is far enough to make them destroy each other,) to extort a greater value from his contemners, by damage; and from others, by example.<sup>66</sup>

The first difficulty concerns the demands of Glory. When we recall that, according to Hobbes, we tend to value ourselves higher than our neighbours, then we realise the inherent and unavoidable obstacle in satisfying the Glory lover.<sup>67</sup> Our inherent inability to judge or

“value” accurately (that is, equally) is the foundational human problem that exacerbates our dealings with each other. Hobbes argues that it is a law of Nature “*That every man acknowledge other for his Equall by Nature.*”<sup>68</sup> Yet all people do not always do this and the glorious never do so, and it is this “Pride” that requires creation of the Leviathan—the “King of the Proud.”<sup>69</sup>

In addition to this core difficulty, there is the problem of construing “signs” of valuing. Unable to see internal motions, we attempt to read external signs, so that “trifles,” such as “a word, a smile, a different opinion” become signs of undervalue.<sup>70</sup> These subtle indicators come to replace the gross signs of security—mastery of people and things—that comforts the Diffident and the Competitive. Yet the trivial and subtle nature of these signs shows how easy it is for us to misconstrue them, especially given our initial suspicions that we are being undervalued. Finally, the problem of Glory is that it enlarges the Glorious. The Glory lover can be personally slighted by ‘reflexion’—by undervaluing “their Kindred, their Friends, their Nation, their Profession, or their Name.”<sup>71</sup> Thus, Glory expands the “self” of a person from his “body” to include a range of other things not usually linked to him. This, of course, is part of the intense pleasure of Glory, the feeling of being bigger, greater, or more majestic. Indeed, the Glorious falls in love with his reputation because “extraordinary power” continually satisfies the never-ending desire for power. Yet such passionate attachment to glory and its feeling of enlargement exposes the glorious to greater risk of undervaluing and therefore anxiety, demanding greater vigilance and attention in satisfying the need for glory.

These problems in establishing true valuation pale in comparison with what is required to restore the joy or pleasure of glory upon being slighted. The glory lover needs to “extort a greater value from his contemnors, by dommage; and from others, by example.” In short, the glory lover must prove his worth by publicly injuring the contemnors so that the victim will concede superiority and others will see in the injury proof of the glory lover’s

power. Note the core dilemma for the glory lover: he is compelled to risk himself to show his power. Sustaining the joy that is glory may necessitate harming his body or undermining his power as property. In the extreme case, the glorious may risk his own life to show his power. Therefore, the pleasure of glory is not checked by the moderating demands of security and property in two senses. The first is in the sense that we have noted—the glorious will illogically sacrifice his life for his name. The second is that the pleasure of glory seeks to ever-increase its delectation—glory will in social terms seek ever greater mastery, at the risk of security. Empire rather than “realistic accommodation” is the end point of glory.<sup>72</sup>

### ***Glory and International Relations***

The discussion above indicates that it is the glory-seeker who will be Hobbes’ sovereign. According to Hobbes, war, the amoral, logical consequence of human “Endeavour,” is premised on the tendency of the Glorious type to challenge and test each other regarding their worth, thereby compelling both the Diffident and the Competitive to enter into warfare far beyond what they would ordinarily wage.<sup>73</sup> If the Glorious could exist without struggling—that is, with an assurance of their power—then the Diffident (and perhaps the Competitive to a great degree) could lead a life as peaceful and productive as those of bees or ants.<sup>74</sup> Hence Hobbes’ institutional arrangement where challenges to the sole glorious are no longer possible or feasible, and where the Diffident and Competitive can prosper in his shadow.<sup>75</sup>

But such sovereignty will only fuel the pride of the glorious. As sovereign his own sense of worth (and therefore pleasure in contemplating it) will now be confirmed by success and magnified by the grandeur of office. The greater and more powerful the commonwealth the more glorious the sovereign. With such greatness comes the increased likelihood of being contemned. Unchecked by common powers, sovereigns in their international relations will easily misconstrue such slights to pride as challenges to security.<sup>76</sup> Sovereigns, seeking

greater pleasure in asserting their glory, and attempting to repudiate the challenges to their reputation, will seek to defend themselves and their nations through proof of their superiority—through the use of increased sovereign power in international relations. To do so, however, they will need to put into place all those elements for successful campaigns, ranging from recruiting of spies to reveal secrets or mislead the enemy, to the construction of forts and defences, to finally the raising of armies and navies to wage war. The more successful such ventures, the more the sovereign will be tempted not to disband such machinery, but to retain their services in more ambitious undertakings, ostensibly to secure itself, in fact to enhance the glory of the nation. Before too long, the sovereign's glory will point to a policy of imperial ambitions, stimulated and sustained by its success.

Hobbes of course knew of these dangers. As he notes, “yet in all times, Kings, and Persons of Sovereigne authority, because of their Independency, are in continuall jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators.”<sup>77</sup> In admitting that there is no real difference between commonwealth by institution and commonwealth by conquest he indicates the ubiquity of international war as the foundation of sovereignty.<sup>78</sup> He also admits that such conquests are often not founded upon the laws of nature:

For such commonwealths, or such monarchs, as affect war for itself, that is to say, out of ambition, or vain-glory, or that make account to revenge every little injury, or disgrace done by their neighbours, if they do not ruine themselves, their fortune must be better than they have reason to expect.<sup>79</sup>

His extensive discussion of the laws of nature, especially against revenge, contumely, pride and arrogance, show his clear-sighted appreciation of the powerful nature of these passions.<sup>80</sup> Aware of this problem, Hobbes may reply that the danger of glory will depend on the circumstances of each country. It is only the sovereign of the wealthy, powerful and

strategically or geographically well-placed commonwealths who will be tempted to seek glory. Yet his account of the continuous skirmishes by the “infinite number of little Lords” in Germany<sup>81</sup> suggests that glory (with its attendant “insatiable appetite, or *Bulimia*, of enlarging Dominion”<sup>82</sup>) may be a problem for all sovereigns. Hobbes may also argue that given the identity of public and private interests in a monarchy, the welfare of the people and the dangers and costs of war will provide a natural check on this glorying:

Now in Monarchy, the private interest is the same with the publique. The riches, power, and honour of a Monarch arise onely from the riches, strength and reputation of his Subjects. For no King can be rich, nor glorious, nor secure; whose Subjects are either poore, or contemptible, or too weak through want, or dissention, to maintain a war against their enemies.<sup>83</sup>

Sensible sovereigns do not take “any delight, or profit they can expect in the dammage, or weakening of their Subjects, in whose vigor, consisteth their own strength and glory.”<sup>84</sup> Clearly continuous warfare that impoverishes its people and ruins a state will make it much more likely to be dissolved or conquered by neighbours. Thus there is a powerful reason for sovereigns to restrain themselves for the sake of preserving their glory.<sup>85</sup> But it is the nature of glory-seekers to risk all for all. Though aware of such arguments which suggest a sort of natural justice for unreasonable actions, the glorious will excuse themselves as the exception who will succeed, and in failure blame everyone but themselves. The lessons learnt from failure may be either too late or disregarded by the glorious sovereigns. This raises a profound question regarding the extent to which the proud can in a sense be done away with in a Hobbesian world, through institutions and laws. Hobbes would of course deny that all glorying should be dispensed with—a certain form is essential for sovereignty. Yet he does argue that his teachings will result in more reasonable sovereigns. As we have noted, he

thinks it is relatively easy to educate the “vulgar” or the “Common people.”<sup>86</sup> If true, then the only problem for Hobbes is to convince such an authority to take up his teaching and apply it in the Commonwealth. But this presents a twofold challenge—the need to oust the rich, potent and learned in the pulpits and the Universities who already have the ear of the sovereign, preaching their vain and false philosophy;<sup>87</sup> and to convince the sovereign to adopt Hobbes’ principles.<sup>88</sup> Hobbes states that a sovereign would take up his teaching because it is to his benefit and security.<sup>89</sup> Yet he concedes that he cannot expect this sovereign to be a scientist. It is sufficient that sovereigns and their ministers know the “Science of Naturall Justice”—they need not understand their origins in “Sciences Mathematical.”<sup>90</sup> What emerges from these attempts is a clear confirmation of the limits to the scientific study of politics and therefore Hobbesian education. If the many are like “clean paper,” and if the sovereign need not understand the mathematical source of the “Science of Naturall Justice,” it seems that even those “diligently, and truly taught” (both the few and the many) will accept Hobbes’ teaching on trust.<sup>91</sup> Indeed, Hobbes’ consistent reference to his teaching as a “Novel Doctrine” shows that his attempt to refound politics on a rational basis is really a replacement of Scholastic Doctrine with what appears to be his new scientific piety, with peace as its credo and power as its theology.<sup>92</sup> Therefore, his “Principles of Reason” are another contending dogma, and *Leviathan* is the new Bible of the Hobbesian world, even containing its own Ten Commandments.<sup>93</sup> As long as the people are educated in Hobbesian terms, accepting the primacy of “power,” “rights” and “social contract,” then the character of the sovereign becomes irrelevant for political rule. Leaving aside the profound questions this argument raises concerning the place of rhetoric and persuasive speech in Hobbes’ understanding of reasoning as reckoning from definitions, Hobbes may be justified in claiming that his new dogmatics, compared with its predecessors, certainly moderate glorying.<sup>94</sup> Yet in doing so he implicitly accepts that ‘who’ is sovereign becomes important.

Moreover, to the extent that glorying is unavoidable and politically necessary, and in so far as it is characterized by a fundamental immoderation or unreasonableness, it is not clear if Hobbes' institutional solution to the problem of domestic politics does not reassert, by means of international glorying, the problem of pride in a much more powerful and therefore dangerous way.

### ***Glorious Sovereign and Leadership***

Students of international relations influenced by Hobbes have tended to focus on the primacy of fear in shaping international politics. As Hobbes' writings indicate there are sound reasons for taking such an approach. This concentration on fear, however, has been at the expense of neglecting the other passions that, according to Hobbes, lead to political instability and war. As we have seen, Hobbes had an extensive and sophisticated insight into the significance of honour and glory in shaping both domestic and international politics, a theme that has received insufficient attention in the contemporary international relations scholarship. Thus a return to Hobbes and his subtly crafted writings yields a more subtle appreciation of the range of passions that dominate politics. Such a return also reveals, however, a persistent ambiguity in both Hobbes and contemporary scholarship influenced by him. What is the role and influence of individuals, and therefore political leadership, in determining the character of international relations?

Hobbes claims to be the first true founder of the science of politics or the first political philosopher. He presents his turn to politics as a diversion from his true interests in the "speculation of Bodies Naturall." This diversion, "occassioned by the disorders of the present time," is "without partiality, without application, and without other designe" than "to advance the Civill Power."<sup>95</sup> Hobbes seeks to redefine classical, Christian and even Machiavellian virtue with his new democratic reasonableness. This new virtue, derived from the dignity of

keeping one's word, and respecting others, appears indifferent to the necessity of good judgment or prudence, especially from its leaders. Thus both his international and domestic politics is at the mercy of the character of the leader, who in his opinion will have precisely that constitution that will make the *Leviathan* impossible.<sup>96</sup> Though he appears to be founding the modern liberal state, reliant on rights and commodious living made possible by industry and scientific innovation, what he designs exposes the probability of the armed camp. In this way Hobbes' apparent disregard of international relations reveals the Achilles heel of his teaching altogether—the absence of prudential statesmanship essential for the maintenance of such an institutional solution. Hobbes may counter that he is that person, and that such insight is necessary only once, and has been undertaken by him through his writings. Hobbes, it seems, risks public condemnation as well as the animosity of the few and powerful whom he seeks to displace not out of any personal motive of gain or advantage but for public good.<sup>97</sup> *Leviathan*, it would seem, is proof of the need and force of nobility or “gallantness of courage” in securing political stability, a gallantness that Hobbes considers rarely found and which is seemingly unaccountable in terms of his account of human “endeavour.”<sup>98</sup> Leaving aside the problem of glorying in such a claim, it is not clear that Hobbes' artifice, presuming an unknowable and therefore unpredictable cosmos, can therefore truly withstand or keep at bay the mysterious forces that move and shape all matter.<sup>99</sup> Hobbes' reason does not conquer chance.

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### Notes

<sup>1</sup> For an overview of his life see John Aubry, *Brief Lives*, ed. Oliver Lawson Dick (London: Secker & Warburg, 1958) and Hobbes' correspondence in the Clarendon edition of Hobbes' works, *The Correspondence of Thomas Hobbes*, vols I, II, ed. Noel Malcolm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, 1997).

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<sup>2</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. C. B. Macpherson (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1968), **REVIEW AND CONCLUSION, 728-9**, hereafter cited as: Hobbes, *Leviathan*, chapter number, page number.

<sup>3</sup> Corroborated by the Frontispiece to the *Leviathan*, where the sovereign's gaze is directed away from the borders into the state itself.

<sup>4</sup> With reference to his "Science of Naturall Justice," he notes that, "neither *Plato*, nor any other Philosopher hitherto, hath put into order, and sufficiently, or probably proved all the Theoremes of Morall doctrine, that men may learn thereby, both how to govern, and how to obey." Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 31, 407-8.

<sup>5</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 30, 378. Emphasis added.

<sup>6</sup> Thus I take up Kant's critique of Hobbes developed in *Perpetual Peace* and "Idea for Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose"—that the problem of a perfect civil constitution cannot be solved unless the problem of external relations with other states is addressed—but do so from Hobbes' own presuppositions. On the relationship between Hobbes and Kant see Howard Williams, *Kant's Critique of Hobbes* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2003).

<sup>7</sup> As has often been noted, Hobbes regards his methodological innovation as consisting of applying the principles of mathematics generally, and geometry more specifically, to human beings. According to him, the results of such an undertaking—starting with definitions and then adding or subtracting words until proper conclusions are reached—are irrefutable truths regarding politics, especially concerning the essential rights of sovereigns and the obedience owed by subjects. Hobbes is not modest regarding his achievement.

<sup>8</sup> *Leviathan*, 30, 394.

<sup>9</sup> Deceptively simple because in reducing the Law of Nations to Hobbesian Law of Nature he implicitly repudiates stoic notions of *ius gentium*: see Thomas L. Pangle and Peter J.

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Ahrens Dorf, *Justice Among Nations: On the Moral Basis of Power and Peace* (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1999), 144-153. For Hobbes' earlier account of the place of international relations see *De Cive*, in *Man and Citizen*. ed., trans. Bernard Gert (Gloucester, Mass: Peter Smith, DATE), chapter 10, paragraph 17; chapter 14, paragraph 4. Hereafter cited as: Hobbes, *De Cive*, chapter number, paragraph number.

<sup>10</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 14, 189-190.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 13, 185-6.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 14, 190.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 13, 187, 186.

<sup>14</sup> For the influence of Hobbes on modern realists, such as Morgenthau, Niebhur, Carr, Butterfield, Osgood, Kennan, Beitz and Kissinger see C. Navari, "Hobbes, the State of Nature and the Laws of Nature," in *Classical Theories of International Relations*, ed. Ian Clark and Iver Neumann (Macmillan Press: Houndmills, 1996), PAGE NUMBERS?; H. Williams, *International Relations in Political Theory*, (Open University Press: Milton Keys, 1992); M. Smith, *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger* (Louisiana State University Press: Baton Rouge, 1986). On his continuing influence on neo-realists, such as Walz, see Pangle and Ahrens Dorf, *Justice Among Nations*, 239-257.

<sup>15</sup> It became the basis of the so-called English school of international relations: see Hedley Bull, "Hobbes and International Anarchy," *Social Research* 41 (1977): 717-38; Claire Cutler, "The Grotian Tradition in International Relations," *Review of International Studies* 17 (1991): 41-65; Martin Wight, *International Relations: Three Traditions* (London: Holmes and Meier, 1992); and the discussion in Michael C. Williams, "Hobbes and international relations: a reconsideration," *International Organization* 50, no. 2 (1996): 213-236.

<sup>16</sup> I draw on Laurie Johnson, *Thucydides, Hobbes, and the Interpretation of Realism* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1993), 87-94.

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For similar or more ambitious attempts to develop a Hobbesian law of nations see Donald W. Hanson, "Thomas Hobbes's 'Highway to Peace,'" *International Organization* 38, no. 2 (Spring 1984): 329-354 and Francis Cheneval, "The Hobbesian case for multilateralism," *Swiss Political Science Review*, 13, no. 3 (2007): 309-335.

<sup>17</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 11, par 2; L 17, para 2) DIFFERENT CITATION FORMAT. ALL OTHERS REFER TO CHAPTER AND PAGE.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 13, 187-8.

<sup>19</sup> Johnson, *Thucydides, Hobbes, and the Interpretation of Realism*, 87.

<sup>20</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 14, 190.

<sup>21</sup> The remaining seventeen laws are enumerated in chapter xv: 3. justice; 4. gratitude; 5. complaisance; 6. pardon; 7. to look to the future in revenge; 8. against contumely; 9. against pride; 10. against arrogance; 11. equity; 12. equal use of common things; 13. the use of lot; 14. primogeniture; 15. mediators; 16. submission to arbitrement; 17. no man is his own judge; 18. impartiality of judges.

<sup>22</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 23, 293.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 14, 198.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 29, 363-4; 19, 240.

<sup>25</sup> For a discussion of these themes, including the Kantian critique of Hobbes, see Nancy A. Stanlick, "A Hobbesian view of international sovereignty," *Journal of Social Philosophy* 37, no. 4 (2006): 552-565; Ernst B. Haas, "Reason and Change in International Life: Justifying a Hypothesis," *Journal of International Affairs*, 44, no. 1 (Spring 1990): 209; Charles Covell, *Kant and the Law of Peace: A Study in The Philosophy of International Law and International Relations* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: MacMillan Press; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998); Williams, *Kant's Critique of Hobbes*.

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<sup>26</sup> On the idea of “normative prudence” in international relations see Alberto R Coll, “Normative Prudence as a Tradition of Statecraft,” *Ethics & International Affairs* 5, no. 1 (1991): 33-51.

<sup>27</sup> Note that Hobbes distinguishes three types of sovereignty—Monarchy, Aristocracy and Democracy. *Leviathan*, 19, 239.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, Introduction, 81.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, SECTION MISSING, 75. INTRODUCTION?

<sup>30</sup> At least Hobbes still relied on living creatures such as geese. Bentham extends this argument to its limits when in his *Panopticon* he implies that no-one need occupy the sovereign’s place.

<sup>31</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 15, 211.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 8, 138. Note, however, how he seemingly retracts this position—equality must be the new consensus, even if not true: “or if Nature have made men unequal; yet because men that think themselves equall, will not enter into conditions of Peace, but upon Equall termes, such equalitie must be admitted.” The breach of this precept is called “Pride.” *Leviathan*, 15, 211. For his more profound critique of prudence, see his distinction between “Prudence,” based on experience, and “Science,” which relies on “Reason” and “*Reckoning* (that is, Adding and Subtracting [sic]) of the Consequences of generall names agreed upon,” *Leviathan*, 3, 97; 5, 111-5.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 17, 227.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, SECTION MISSING, 75. INTRODUCTION?

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 30, 388.

<sup>36</sup> See, for example, Hobbes’ preference for monarchy over democracy on the grounds of the greater knowledge and understanding that is possible for the monarch. Contrary to modern deliberative democrats, Hobbes suggests that democratic representatives know more about

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acquiring wealth than knowledge, and in giving their advice in long discourses excite men to action rather than understanding: “For the *Understanding* is by the flame of the Passions, never enlightned, but dazled,” *Leviathan*, 19, 242.

<sup>37</sup> On the rhetoric see Quentin Skinner, “Thomas Hobbes: Rhetoric and the Construction of Morality,” *Proceedings of the British Academy* 76 (1990): 1-61; Quentin Skinner, *Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Haig Patapan, “‘Lord Over the Children of Pride’: the *Vaine-Glorious* Rhetoric of Hobbes’ *Leviathan*,” *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 33, no. 1 (2000): 74-93.

<sup>38</sup> See, for example, the discussions of the rights of the sovereigns by institution (Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 18); of the liberty of subjects (Ibid., 21); of the public ministers of sovereign power (Ibid., 23); and especially of the office of the sovereign representative (Ibid., 30). On counsel to sovereigns see **Mara (1988) BIBLIO DETAILS MISSING.**

<sup>39</sup> See the discussion regarding the “Objection from the Incapacity of the vulgar,” Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 30, 378-9.

<sup>40</sup> On the problem of glory see generally: Leo Strauss, *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, its Basis and its Genesis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953); Gabriella Slomp, *Thomas Hobbes and the Political Philosophy of Glory* (Houndmills: Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000); J. Hampton, “Hobbesian Reflections on Glory as a Cause of Conflict,” in *The Causes of Quarrel—Essays on Peace, War and Thomas Hobbes*, ed. Peter Caws (Beacon Press: Boston, 1989), 78-96; William Sacksteder, “Mutually Acceptable Glory as a Cause of Conflict,” in Ibid., 97-113; Andrew Altman, “Glory, Respect, and Violent Conflict,” in Ibid., 114-127

<sup>41</sup> The reason for this, as we will see, is that it is only the proud who would be willing to pursue power through glory.

<sup>42</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 17, 225; 11, 160.

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<sup>43</sup> Ibid., 11, 160.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., 6, 118.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., 11, 160.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., 6, 124; 11, 161.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., 11, 161.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., 8, 139.

<sup>49</sup> See Hobbes' discussion of "Manners" and the "NATURALL CONDITION of mankind," *Leviathan*, 11, 160-168; 13, 183-188. There is a fourth type, the scientist, whom Hobbes holds out as the hope and promise of peace for humanity. The scientist experiences intense pleasure due to the pleasures of curiosity. Such joy, results in Glorifying, and "ADMIRATION," which appears more self-sufficient, Ibid., 6, 124. But the scientist is still public-spirited: see, for example, the loyalty of scientists (Ibid., 46, 683-4); their contribution to commodious living (Ibid., 11, 162). Note, however, that Hobbes calls the sciences "small Power," Ibid., 10, 151.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., 13, 184.

<sup>51</sup> Hobbes, *Human Nature*, in *The Elements of Law: Human Nature and De Corpore Politico*, ed. J.C.A. Gaskin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), XIV, 3, hereafter cited as: Hobbes, *Human Nature*, chapter number, section number.

<sup>52</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 11, 161; *Human Nature*, XIV, 3.

<sup>53</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 13, 184.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid., 13, 185. Hobbes' discussion of fear has been central to the international relations scholarship on the 'security dilemma.' In this context see John Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 2, no. 2 (1950): 157-180; Ken Booth, and Nicholas J. Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in*

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*World Politics* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Edward A. Kolodziej, *Security and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Andrew H. Kydd, *Trust and Mistrust in International Relations* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 2005).

<sup>56</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 13, 185.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, 6, 123.

<sup>58</sup> These human types are differentiated in part by their different amounts of endeavour. Greater endeavour and thus greater passion is the result of a combination of bodily factors (i.e., greater innate vital motion, more sensitive sense organs: Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 8, 135) and “the natural temper of the brain” (i.e., stronger imagination, quicker reason: *Leviathan*, 8, 135-139; Hobbes, *Human Nature*, X, 1.

<sup>59</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 6, 122.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, 6, 124-125. There are two types of glorying: confidence and vain-glory. Confidence is a “constant hope of ourselves” based on “the experience” of our “own former actions.” Vain-glory is imagining power based “on the flattery of others; or onely supposed by himselfe, for delight in the consequences of it,” *Ibid.*, 6, 125.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, 13, 184; 11, 161.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, 13, 184.

<sup>63</sup> Hobbes, *Human Nature*, XIV, 3; *Leviathan*, 17, 226.

<sup>64</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 6, 125.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, 13, 185.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>67</sup> People think they are wiser than others because they “see their own wit at hand, and other mens at a distance.” The only exceptions are those “whom by Fame, or for concurring with themselves, they approve.” *Ibid.*, 13, 184.

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<sup>68</sup> Ibid., 15, 211.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid., 28, 362. For an insight into the character of Hobbes' piety compare the Leviathan, a creature of the Lord, set over the children of pride (John 41: 34), with Hobbes' artificial body, made by the "Art of man," whose business is "*Salus Populi*" or the peoples' safety, Ibid., Introduction, 81.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid., 13, 184.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., 13, 185.

<sup>72</sup> This discussion does not address the added complexity of how religion will shape glorying. This is significant because, as noted above, Hobbes accepts that in international relations, there being "no Court of Naturall Justice," the sovereign will be bound, "but in the Conscience onely; where not Man, but God raigneth," *Leviathan*, 30, 394. An adequate understanding of Hobbes' treatment of this problem would have to start with his discussion of religion in the Third and Fourth Parts of the *Leviathan*, as well as the *Behemoth*, where he examines the role of religion in international relations.

<sup>73</sup> As Hobbes says, the "Desires, and other Passions of man, are in themselves no Sin," *Leviathan* 13, 10; 187. POSSIBLE PAGE NUMBER MISSING FROM FIRST REFERENCE.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid., 17, 225. Note Hobbes' list of six elements that distinguish social animals (bees and ants) and humans emphasises the problem of honour. Ibid., 17, 225-227.

<sup>75</sup> Other glory-lovers besides the sovereign are soberly advised by Hobbes not to attempt to attain "Sovereignty by Rebellion" lest they perish in the try. The sovereign is advised to take such people in as counsellors or let them acquire limited glory by successful acquisition in the marketplace. In all circumstances, however, the sovereign must keep a close eye on the power or "Popularity" of any of his subjects. Ibid., 15, 205; 30, 391-92; 30, 393.

<sup>76</sup> Without denying, of course, that slights may in fact constitute such a security threat.

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<sup>77</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 13, 187.

<sup>78</sup> The identity lies in the fact that fear is the basis of both forms of sovereignty. *Ibid.*, 20, 252.

<sup>79</sup> Hobbes, *De Cive*, CHAPTER NUMBER MISSING, 220.

<sup>80</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 15, 210-12.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, 10, 158.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, 29, 375.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, 19, 241-2.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, 18, 238.

<sup>85</sup> Once other sovereigns adopt such an approach then commercial glory assumes prominence and modifies martial glory and cruelty: see Montesquieu's *Spirit of the Laws* and the modern scholarship on 'democratic peace.'

<sup>86</sup> Of the incapacity of the "vulgar" or the "Common people" he makes a twofold claim. First, his teaching is so "consonant to Reason" that no unprejudiced person would have difficulty understanding it. The second is more radical: most people are like "clean paper," ready to receive whatever the Public Authority impresses on them. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 30, 379.

<sup>87</sup> See generally *Leviathan*, chapter 46 regarding vain philosophy and fabulous traditions. Note that Hobbes is critical of the pagans generally, especially Aristotle (but not Plato, because of his emphasis on geometry). But his real concern is in fact scholasticism or Thomism—that is, the Christian appropriation of classical political philosophy (although he says that the Schoolmen may not have always appropriated Aristotle's true teaching because they did not understand his need to write in such a way as to avoid the fate of Socrates: *Leviathan*, 46, 692. He singles out the famous scholastic Suarez, whom he attacks for writing "whole volumes" of so much "Absurdity" that Suarez must have been either "Mad" or trying "to make others so." *Ibid.*, 8, 147.

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<sup>88</sup> See, for example, the discussion of the advantages of such teaching for the sovereign in *Leviathan*, chapter 30, where Hobbes addresses the duties of the sovereign.

<sup>89</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 30, 379.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, 31, 407. The only way such a sovereign will accept Hobbes' Doctrine is by reading "in himself, not this or that particular man; but Man-kind," as outlined by Hobbes (TITLE MISSING (LEVIATHAN??) Introduction, 83). In doing so he will avoid the "uselesse" Platonic attempt to have "Sovereigns and Philosophers." *Ibid.*, 31, 407.

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*, 30, 377. Compare this with his consistent attempt to reject trust and faith in the authority of books. He says, for example, that "they that trusting onely to the authority of books, follow the blind blindly." *Ibid.*, 5, 21. Indeed, words "are the mony of fooles, that value them by the authority of an *Aristotle*, a *Cicero*, or a *Thomas*, or any other Doctor whatsoever." *Ibid.*, 4, 106.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*, Conclusion, 726.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, 30, 380-83.

<sup>94</sup> Hobbes' understanding of "Science"—which is based on "Reason"—as "Reckoning (that is, Adding and Subtracting) of the Consequences of generall names agreed upon" seems to sit uneasily with the importance of rhetoric for Hobbes. *Leviathan*, 5, 111. On this question see especially Skinner, "Thomas Hobbes: Rhetoric and the Construction of Morality," and *Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes*, and Patapan, "'Lord Over the Children of Pride': the Vaine-Glorious Rhetoric of Hobbes."

<sup>95</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, A Review and Conclusion, 728; Dedication, 75.

<sup>96</sup> On the problem of "agency" in "realist" international relations theory see Johnson, *Thucydides, Hobbes, and the Interpretation of Realism*, 148-200.

<sup>97</sup> In the epistle dedicatory to *De Homine* (1658), Hobbes says that its publication has been delayed because he had been "fighting the beasts" and had to answer "clamourings and

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insults” after he published *De Cive* (1642, 1647). Hobbes, *De Homine*, in *Man and Citizen*. ed., trans. Gert, 33-86, 35. In *Behemoth* (completed around 1668), he states that teaching the science of justice can be dangerous, and indeed he seemed to have published it to refute attacks on *Leviathan*. Hobbes, *Behemoth or The Long Parliament*, ed. Ferdinand Töennies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990). *Leviathan* itself was published in 1651, years after he escaped to France. Finally, Hobbes refused to publish the *Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Law* in his lifetime.

<sup>98</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 15, 207. Can Hobbes the scientist account for Hobbes the author? On Shaftesbury’s (*Characteristicks*, Volume I, treatise II, section I, paragraph 90) sarcastic assessment that while Hobbes held that there is “nothing which naturally drew us to the Love of what was without, or beyond ourselves,” the “Love of such great Truths and sovereign Maxims as he imagin’d these to be, made him the most laborious of all Men in composing Systems of this kind for our Use; and forc’d him, notwithstanding his natural Fear, to run continually the highest risk of being a Martyr for our Deliverance” see Haig Patapan and Jeffrey Sikkenga, “Love and the Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes’ critique of Platonic,” *Eros. Political Theory: An International Journal of Political Philosophy* 36, no. 6 (2008): 803-826. For a comparable argument regarding Machiavelli and modern philosophers more generally see Patapan, *Machiavelli in Love: the Modern Politics of Love and Fear* (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2006).

<sup>99</sup> See Cooper’s suggestion that Hobbes as philosopher does not show his pride, and in fact redefines the vocation of the philosopher. Julie E. Cooper, “Thomas Hobbes on the political theorist’s vocation,” *The Historical Journal*, 50, no. 3(2007): 519–547.