

Chapter 1: Problems in the Field of Cosmopolitanism

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Introduction¹

The recent resurgence of interest in the area owes much to the debate sparked by Nussbaum's (1994) polemical essay on patriotism and cosmopolitanism. An ensuing debate (Nussbaum and Cohen 1996) reinvigorated the concept of cosmopolitanism but also reminded us of its inherent limitations and contradictions: while it commonly represents a tool for radical social imagination through projections of cosmopolitan democracy, law and citizenship (Archibugi and Held 1995; Held 1995; Hutchings and Dannreuther 1999), it is also in danger of being an almost meaningless and glib catchphrase (Pollock et al. 2000).

The idea of cosmopolitanism has 'a nice, high-minded ring to it', as Himmelfarb (1996: 77) notes, but while the inherently abstract utopian value of the term makes a good promise, it does not necessarily make a good analytical tool. We concur with Holton (2002: 154) that the notion of cosmopolitanism 'raises questions about the coherence of this increasingly diffuse and somewhat vague concept for purposes of social enquiry'. Our approach engages with the current literature on cosmopolitanism, but refutes excessively abstract theorizations. We prefer to speak about cosmopolitanism as a progressive humanistic ideal which continues to be embedded in the structural conditions of modernity. We make a case for a more

¹ Parts of this Chapter are developed from Skrbis et al (2004).

rigorous conceptualization of cosmopolitanism that recognizes the validity of two enduring characteristics of the modern era: the nation state and citizenship (Boli and Thomas 1999).

By understanding cosmopolitanism as embedded in structural conditions defined by citizenship and the nation state, we should be able to better understand not only the possibility of the transcendence of the present, but also the limits of the social.

Therefore, we are steadfastly against a cosmopolitanism that fatally accepts the erosion of the nation state; we are against a cosmopolitanism that allows researchers, with good conscience, to ignore questions of the government of internationally mobile individuals; and, finally, we do not see cosmopolitan scholarship advanced when the world is seen as caught up in a Manichean dialectic between Kantian, cosmopolitan perpetual peace and a brutish Hobbesian order (Kagan 2003).

People (or at least *some* people) work, love, marry and live internationally and combine multiple loyalties and identities in their lives. Chernobyl, the AIDS virus, terrorism and CNN make a potent and far-reaching combination of pollution, death, fear and indoctrination precisely because of the permeability of borders. These new global interdependencies give rise to new kinds of human sociability (Beck 2002: 30). For Appadurai (1990) the new dynamics of time-space compression give rise to new dimensions that are captured in terms such as ethnoscapes, technoscapes, financescapes, mediascapes and ideoscapes. These various scapes are indicative of the power of international flows, which show little regard for notions of a national boundary. Thinking 'ourselves beyond the nation' (Appadurai 1993: 411), beyond

citizenship (Soysal 1994), and beyond the fixities of time and space is becoming not only easier, but also increasingly vital.

Not surprisingly, rootlessness, movement, homelessness and nomadism have become the motifs of the analyst of cosmopolitanism. Bauman (1996) likens modern individuals and life to pilgrims and pilgrimage, as identity and individuality shun fixity at any cost. Said (1979: 18-19) talks about a generalized condition of homelessness, an idea that has made its way into many sociological and anthropological texts. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) dwell on the nomad, whose only real place of belonging is movement itself. Similarly, Melluci (1989) likens members of modern social movements to nomads because of their lack of long-term commitments. The metaphor of nomadism is one of the most common ways in which the tension between fixity and fluidity, sedentarianism and dispersion is thematized.

Most contemporary commentators concur that cosmopolitanism – as a subjective outlook, attitude or practice - is associated with a conscious openness to the world and to cultural differences (Beck and Sznaider 2006; Hall 2002; Hannerz 1996; Held 2002; Tomlinson 1999; Urry 2000b; Vertovec and Cohen 2002). Our present times, in which many people have a shared sense of a world as a whole, and experience this through travel, work and exposure to the media, are thus perfectly suited to the proliferation of the idea of cosmopolitanism. The new cosmopolitan subject suffers from 'place polygamy' (Beck 2002b: 24).

Conceptualizing Cosmopolitanism: Four Problems

There are four major problems in the contemporary literature on cosmopolitanism.

The first is a problem of *indeterminacy*: cosmopolitanism as an empty signifier that can stand for almost any given reality and aspiration. The second is a problem of *identification*, and targets the pressing question, 'who is cosmopolitan?' The third grows directly from the first two and we call it the problem of *attribution*: what exactly are the determinants of cosmopolitan disposition and culture? While we turn to these three questions in the next section, the fourth issue of *government* goes to the heart of the problematic associated with the contemporary deliberations of cosmopolitanism. It is through the exploration of this last question that we can see cosmopolitanism as rooted in historical, political, social and economic realities of the modern era.

The Problem of Indeterminacy

We take the problem of indeterminacy to be the ultimate collapse of meaning of the concept of cosmopolitanism. This problem is best illustrated in Pollock et al. (2000), who suggest that the best way to deal with the nascent possibilities of cosmopolitanism is to eschew definition or specification of what cosmopolitanism involves, or who 'cosmopolitans' might be. According to this argument, while the problem of cosmopolitanism comprises some of the most pressing contemporary questions related to globalization, nationalism, ethnicity and identity, by their nature the practices and attitudes of the cosmopolitan are unknowable. This type of intellectual strategy is apparently designed to serve the purpose of leaving the category of the cosmopolitan entirely open, free of foreclosure by any set of academic, ethnic or meta-national discourses. Such a position is predicated on the notion that the political possibilities of cosmopolitanism are promising and potentially open to damage by significant attempts at academic territorialization. For

Pollock et al. (2000: 577):

cosmopolitanism may indeed be a project whose conceptual content and pragmatic character are not only as yet unspecified but also must always escape positive and definite specification, precisely because specifying cosmopolitanism positively and definitely is an unc cosmopolitan thing to do.

If we do not know what cosmopolitanism stands for, how can we trust these authors, for example, when they affirm that Sarajevo's cosmopolitanism has been destroyed in the 1990s? How can we know that it was truly cosmopolitan before then? What exactly would make it cosmopolitan again? While we are open to the idea that there may be various ways of being cosmopolitan and various possible cosmopolitanisms (Pollock et al. 2000: 458), we do not recognize that this is something that logically follows from Pollock et al.'s anti-empirical premises.

When Beck defines cosmopolitan society as 'a new way of doing business and of working, a new kind of identity and politics as well as a new kind of everyday space-time experience and of human sociability', he concludes that 'It is impossible to even outline this claim here' (2002b: 30). This is precisely the kind of impotence that is inherent to current discussions on cosmopolitanism. And to make helplessness contradictory, Beck manages to clearly identify the 'enemies' of cosmopolitan societies (2002b: 37).

Related to this idea of 'indeterminable cosmopolitanism' is the suggestion that cosmopolitanism represents the intersection of new historical styles of social and

national relations that defy social-structural grounding. This literature constructs cosmopolitanism as a myth by imagining cosmopolitan spaces as free havens of cultural exchange, where 'groups of different religious and ethnic backgrounds intermingl[e] and exchange[e] ideas and lifestyles' (Meijer 1999:1). Yet despite performing this mythologizing function, these creeds fail to capture the specific set of economic, cultural and social changes that facilitate the development of cosmopolitanization. As Calhoun (2002b: 108) has reminded us, we need to 'recognize the extent to which the cosmopolitan appreciation of global diversity is based on the privileges of wealth and perhaps, especially, citizenship in certain states'. The fantasy of cosmopolitanism is so appealing and effective that it discourages the attempt to tie down any real cosmopolitans; but we must resist the lure of this fantasy if we wish to make cosmopolitanism a valuable analytical concept.

The Problem of Identification

We are not suggesting that the solution to the problem of indeterminacy is necessarily in painstaking attempts to identify cosmopolitan subjects. Such an ambition would give rise to a new set of problems that we associate with the problem of identification. In the literature we find three populations that have been represented as archetypal cosmopolitans: global business elites, refugees and expatriates.

Kanter (1995) tags the cosmopolitans as members of a 'world class' global business elite who possess the knowledge and skills that currently fit productively with economic transformations engendered by rounds of globalization across cutting-edge, emerging industries. For Kanter, the cosmopolitans are 'card carrying

members of the world class' who are rich in the 'three C's' (1995: 22-23): concepts, competence, and connections. She argues that this gives them access to the latest and most marketable knowledge, the intellectual and social ability to operate at superior standards anywhere in the world, and the ability to forge global networks. Kanter's emphasis is on the business elites of the cosmopolitan class, which she defines as 'a social class defined by its ability to command resources and operate beyond borders and across wide territories' (Kanter 1995: 22). Although Kanter focuses too heavily on those who make up the über-cosmopolitan class, by summarizing the key cosmopolitan asset as a unique 'mind-set' (1995: 23), a useful aspect of Kanter's argument emerges: cosmopolitan classes possess forms of intellectual, social and cultural capital highly valued in the global economy. The Triple Cs are somewhat similar to Kirwan-Taylor's (2000) cosmocrats, the people with MBAs and law degrees, along with a rather snobbish attitude towards those not belonging to their class and with a patronizing attitude towards the cultural other. They are closer to Calhoun's 'frequent travellers' than Kanter's über-citizens, but they certainly see themselves as cosmopolitans. These über-citizens are invariably from first-world countries or the privileged classes whose identification is largely with Western ideals. Under the cosmopolitan identity lurks the recognizable citizen of an advanced liberal democratic 'national' state or the monied and privileged individual from elsewhere, who just happens to be mobile.

At the other extreme to Kanter's world-class citizens are the

victims of modernity, failed by capitalism's upward mobility, and bereft of those comforts and customs of national belonging. Refugees, peoples of the diaspora, and migrants and exiles represent the spirit of the cosmopolitical community (Pollock et al.2000: 582).

Although these two radically different approaches base cosmopolitan identity on mobility across space and time, they present us with an interesting dilemma. Kanter's definition is more in accordance with traditional understandings of cosmopolitanism because the members of her cosmopolitan class have made a choice on the basis of positive, conscious effort. Refugees, by contrast, not only lack the free will to move but may even consciously prefer to be locals and parochials – anything rather than suffering the tragedy of their enforced cosmopolitanism. And if elite cosmopolitans are part of 'a high order political game' (Kanter 1995: 25), refugees are usually reduced to being the silent pawns in the games of others. In both definitions, human movement in itself is seen as a key determinant of cosmopolitanism. Refugees have no other destiny but to move until they find themselves – if ever – on the receiving end of the principle of hospitality (Derrida 2001). Both Kanter (1995) and Pollock et al. (2000) also assume that cosmopolitanism is a position of epistemological privilege *per se* without acknowledging the limitations of so-defined cosmopolitan positions.

In a quite different way, Hannerz (1990: 243) carefully asserts that the expatriate may be most readily associated with cosmopolitanism. Expatriates have chosen to live abroad, but they also can go back when they choose to. Volition and opportunity to return home is what makes them different from refugees. They are also different from the business elite in the sense that their mobility is not predicated on high status. Hannerz refuses to grant expatriates an epistemological privilege, for they may in fact be profoundly parochial and refuse to engage with the host environment: 'Cosmopolitans can be dilettantes as well as connoisseurs' (Hannerz 1992: 253). Expatriates may stand a good chance of turning into cosmopolitans but nothing

guarantees this outcome.

Looking for subject positions taken up by either the elites or the disenfranchised is not the best way to proceed. We do not find much comfort in attempts to add new life to cosmopolitanism by adding colourful adjectives to it. However, we find useful the recent contributions which endorse the plurality and variability of cosmopolitanisms by linking them to fields of social engagement, such as Lamont and Aksartova's (2002) call for a study of 'everyday, practical cosmopolitanisms', or Werbner's (1999) assertion – which goes directly against Kanter's 'elitist' approach – of cosmopolitanism among working-class labour migrants. Our philosophical ideals must not cloud our ability to notice what Malcomson (1998: 238) calls 'the actually existing cosmopolitanisms'. In short, our understanding of cosmopolitanism should not be constructed from a series of imaginary, utopian or ideal types; the fluidity and complexity of cosmopolitanism is only likely to be revealed by the study of its mundane reality.

The Problem of Attribution

It is not easy to discern agreement in the literature as to what are the attributes of cosmopolitanism. In contrast to Kant's Eurocentric vision of cosmopolitanism (Mignolo 2000: 735), most contemporary authors subscribe to the idea of cosmopolitanism as a form of 'planetary conviviality' (Mignolo 2000: 721), a commercially driven 'end of insularity' (Nava 1998) and a series of multiple mobilities (Hannerz 1992; Urry 2000a). Although there appears to be unequivocal agreement between authors of various persuasions to associate cosmopolitanism with positive values (such as 'openness'), this was not always so. If anything,

cosmopolitanism was used in the not-so-distant past to label anyone who did not fit or conform, including intellectuals, Jews, homosexuals and aristocrats (Brennan 1997). Stalin, for example, used the term as an accusation against 'reactionary' elements in Soviet society.

Apart from agreement among contemporary authors that cosmopolitanism designates positive, inclusive values and principles, there is a great deal of diversity when we examine other attributes ascribed to cosmopolitans. For Hannerz (1990), the relevant characteristics of cosmopolitanism include being willing to engage with the cultural Other (both in an aesthetic and intellectual sense), developing dynamic and interdependent relationships with locals ('there are no cosmopolitans without locals'), having a degree of competence and sense of home, or even better, a consciousness of a point of departure. Rabinow (1986: 258) puts it similarly: cosmopolitanism is an 'ethos of macro-interdependencies, with an acute consciousness (often forced upon people) of the inescapabilities and particularities of places, characters, historical trajectories, and fates'. Beck (2002c: 79-80) lists thirteen different 'empirical indicators of *cosmopolitization*' that range from international travel to questions of political representation and manifestations of ecological crises. He acknowledges that these indicators lack both 'comprehensiveness and systematic exposition'. However, these thirteen indicators are perhaps the closest we get to a systematic explanation that could form the basis for an agreed upon characterization of cosmopolitanism in the field. Unfortunately, his attempt stops short of this possibility primarily because he fails to distinguish between commodities, processes (travel, mobility), legal ascriptions (citizenship) and collective loyalties (national identity).

Urry (2000b) and Held (2002) are more selective and precise in their listing of cosmopolitan practices and dispositions. In Held's reasoning, there are three requirements of cultural cosmopolitanism: the recognition of the interconnectedness of political communities, an understanding of overlapping collective fortunes, and an ability to empathize with others and to celebrate difference, diversity and hybridity. For Urry, the cosmopolitan is characterized by an ability to be mobile, the capacity to consume diverse cultural symbols and goods, a willingness to take risks by virtue of encountering the 'other', the ability to reflexively observe and judge different cultures, the possession of semiotic skills to interpret images of others, and general openness to other people and cultures. Similarly, Lamont and Aksartova's (2002: 1) define cosmopolitanism in terms of a practice 'used by ordinary people to bridge boundaries with people who are different from them'. Lamont and Aksartova understand cosmopolitanism as a cultural repertoire of 'particular universalisms' by which individuals understand human similarities (2002: 2-3). Thus they report that the sorts of strategies used by French workers differ from those used by American workers in that the former deploy unique historical and collective referents, yet both base their practices on similar universalistic discourses. While they do not specify cosmopolitan categories, they usefully encourage us to think beyond the limitations of current ways of conceptualizing cosmopolitan practices. Unfortunately, the regular assumption that cosmopolitanism is a form of (Kantian) universalism has condemned many scholars to believe that it can only be understood as an ideal type (Hollinger 1995). However, cosmopolitanism is a lived experience, and one which does not necessarily shy away from particular, local forms (Nava 2007).

Globalization, Cosmopolitanism and the Problem of Government

Beck (2000) discusses cosmopolitan society as 'a second age of modernity', representing a paradigmatic shift from societies operating within the nation state framework. For him, cosmopolitan society not only enforces solidarity with strangers, but also creates conditions for a legally-binding world society of individuals. In line with the essays assembled in Cheah and Robbins (1998), we also take the view that there are different ways in which such an open orientation may emerge, rather than a single liberal Western pathway. In this sense, there are cosmopolitanisms rather than one single form of cosmopolitanism; resistances and blockages to cosmopolitanism are countered and stimulated by the accelerational dynamics of economic, cultural and symbolic capital (Beck 2000).

There is some tension between the idea of cosmopolitanism as a pluralist concept (there are different cosmopolitanisms and people are cosmopolitan in different ways) and the purported origin of cosmopolitanism in Western philosophical thought (Vertovec and Cohen 2002: 14-16). Is the cosmopolitan worldview a view from nowhere, as van der Veer (2002: 165) provocatively puts it, or is it a view of the world from a particular, Western angle? For Calhoun (2002b: 90), there appears little doubt that cosmopolitanism is 'a discourse centred in a Western view of the world', while van der Veer (2002: 166) calls it a Western and profoundly colonial engagement with 'the rest of the world'. There is some productive tension in this West vs. the Rest dilemma (Featherstone 2002: 3), although we see it as largely superseded by existing research on non-Western cosmopolitanisms (e.g. Werbner 1999; Zubaida 2002). What matters most in this context is not whether cosmopolitanism is a Western invention but, rather, whether it can serve as a shared universal value, applicable across different cultural contexts (see the important

analysis of this in Calhoun 2007).

For commentators such as David Held, cosmopolitanism holds out the hope of a new type of citizenship. In this scheme, the old political order, which was closely tied to nation states, has its individual analogue in the citizen, who participates in politics at a variety of levels (borough, city, nation). But a new political order needs a new type of transnational citizen, a cosmopolitan who is no longer 'anchored in fixed borders and territories' but instead pursues 'basic democratic arrangements' at the level of cities or regions – and especially trans-nationally (Hirst and Held 2002). The cosmopolitan, then, becomes the micro-unit, or the agent of change, in a move to a new form of global government. One form of this has been sketched out by George Monbiot (2000), who argues that new forms of global government can be built up from a grass roots level. Now, while it does seem to be the case that new forms of international government are being invented, the basic unit of accountability is still the nation state, and thus the intervention-point of government must remain the citizen of the nation state, rather than the *cosmopolites*. As Hirst and Held (2002) argue, it is notoriously difficult to keep multilevel government accountable; at least in the case of the nation state, there are already mechanisms in place to remove failing (or failed) political actors. At the governmental level, then, it seems that there are strong pressures at work to keep political actors local/national rather than to foster cosmopolitan sentiments. A key question would seem to be: is it possible to build a global democracy, and if so, are our cosmopolitans the key? As an ideal, it sounds laudable, but we should remain sceptical about the possibility of the development of cosmopolitan global democracy. Hirst and Held, again, deflate the cosmopolitan optimist by arguing that modern democracy developed on the basis of

‘sovereign territorial states that had made a huge effort to homogenize their populations, create national languages, common traditions and shared institutions’. In short, democracy requires cultural homogeneity to function and this homogeneity – in its civic and ethno-national versions – is provided by nation state governments (Hirst and Held 2002). However, it is important that we draw attention to a certain ‘mythic’ element to the homogeneity of the nation state. Any such homogenization came, not infrequently, at the cost of the oppression of minorities (religious, ethnic and indigenous). The homogeneity of the nation state is often an effect of the triumph of its ruling elites.

The existing debates on cosmopolitanism, particularly those that emanate from a cultural studies’ perspective, take precious little notice of these structural realities. But there have been a number of notable interventions made in recent times in relation to this issue. Beck (2002b: 34) talks about ‘the limits of transnationality [that] continue to be drawn within national spaces’ and Bryan Turner (2002: 56) critiques Nussbaum’s call to create the new ‘citizens of the world’ without discussing that such new subjects would ‘require a global government to enforce the rights and obligations of citizens. While I can in principle vote in a democratic government as a citizen of a state, I cannot currently enjoy many or any rights as a “global citizen”’. Appiah (1996: 28) similarly emphasizes that we cannot ‘think away’ the state – after all, the existing ‘cultural variability that cosmopolitanism celebrates has come to depend on the existence of a plurality of states’. For Appiah, one of the most important tasks of any cosmopolitan agenda would be to ‘defend the right of others to live in democratic states with rich possibilities of association within and across their borders’ (1996: 29).

However, there are fields of intellectual inquiry in which the ‘modernist’ state system has undergone various kinds of marginalization and even repudiation. For example, John Rawls (1993; 1999) has outlined the vision of a modern global peace – a cosmopolitan age – in which moral rational individuals will attain international justice. In similar vein, multicultural theory outlines a new postmodern politics in which the democratic state will directly represent its moral communities (Bader 1999; Taylor 1994) in a system that breaks free from the shackles of the nation state. Beck expresses this possibility: ‘Just as the a-religious state finally made possible the peaceful coexistence of multiple religions side by side’, he writes, ‘the cosmopolitan state could provide the conditions for multiple national and religious identities to coexist through the principle of constitutional tolerance’ (2002b: 50).

The Cosmopolitan Disposition

The term ‘disposition’ has gained currency in the cosmopolitanism field (eg. Vertovec and Cohen 2002: 14; Featherstone 2002: 1), bearing the marks of Bourdieu’s (1977) concept of the habitus. Bourdieu understands the habitus to be a set of principles and procedures which people use in their relations with objects and others. It is a set of dispositions for use in practice, which individuals use for self-orientation. The habitus is formed in individuals through historically and socially situated conditions, and while a person’s habitus will direct them toward particular choices, it does not amount to obedience to rules. In defining the habitus, in shorthand, as ‘a system of dispositions’ (Bourdieu 1977: 214), Bourdieu clarifies three aspects of what he means by disposition, with the most particular component being that it is a ‘predisposition,

tendency, propensity or inclination' (Bourdieu 1977: 214). As we have specified, commentators commonly suggest that in terms of 'disposition', cosmopolitanism should be understood principally as an attitude of 'openness' toward others cultures (Hannerz 1996; Tomlinson 1999; Urry 2000b; Vertovec and Cohen 2002).

The notion of openness, however, is rather vague and diffuse (Skrbis and Woodward 2007). How is such openness manifested, and what are the sentiments that are embedded within the general attitudinal category of openness? 'Cultural openness' can be manifested in various ways, including, as Urry (2000b) points out, in both intellectual and aesthetic domains. But it must also involve emotional and moral/ethical commitments. Emotional commitment is demonstrated by an empathy with and interest in other cultures, which fuses intellectual outlooks with dispositions centred on such things as pleasurable personal experiences or exposure to media that predispose one to react positively to the idea of contact with other cultures. Closely related to this is a recognition that much openness to other cultures and places derives from a strong ethical commitment to universalist values and ideas that are expected to reach beyond the local (Bauböck 2002: 112). Cosmopolitanism, in other words, entails a distinct ethical orientation towards selflessness, worldliness, and communitarianism. The close connection between ethical commitment and cosmopolitan disposition has been one of the key characteristics of cosmopolitanism since the Stoics, but it has become pronounced in the modern era. Distinctly ethical commitments drive much of the contemporary environmental, anti-war and anti-globalization movements.

In sociological research, there have been few attempts to operationalize and understand empirically what these engagements are and how they might be

identified. Using focus group research and content analysis, Urry (2000b) has made progress toward establishing aspects of the everyday reception and interpretation of cosmopolitan texts in the media. Urry's exploration of understandings of cosmopolitanism revealed that media representations have effectively created, via the production and dissemination of cultural symbols through advertising, music, and television, a substantial foundation for the consumption of banal cosmopolitan images. On the basis of this, Urry finds that consumption of such visual and narrative 'stagings of contemporary global life', and the understandings of globalism they engender, may lay the groundwork for the emergence of a cosmopolitan civil society. In this sense, Urry is close to Giddens, except the former emphasizes the cultural basis for cosmopolitanism, while the latter emphasizes the political basis. In an analysis of Australian survey data on popular attitudes to globalization, Holton and Phillips' (2001) study effectively operationalizes the economic and political dimensions of the concept, including attitudes towards protectionism, policies of the United Nations, and foreign economic investment. In terms of cultural, emotional and ethical attitudes and dispositions, which we see as forming a crucial component of the cosmopolitan outlook, Holton and Phillips' conceptualization is less useful, telling us few things about the cultural dimensions of change, the reasons behind it, and the ways individuals adopt and adapt cosmopolitan or global outlooks, manners and consumption styles. Yet their data do tell us who is more likely to be positively disposed to accepting globalization: those who have travelled or lived in another country, those who have used the Internet and made overseas phone calls, those with higher levels of education, and (to a lesser extent) men rather than women and younger rather than older respondents. In contrast, Lamont and Aksartova's (2002) approach is decidedly culturalist, using in-depth interviews to study cultural practices and repertoires used among working class men. They reject the elitist

assumptions of the literature that focuses on cosmopolitanism as a strategy of the upper-middle classes. Their interview data shows how cultural groups use particular universalistic discourses to bridge boundaries of difference. Rather than a cosmopolitanism grounded in the consumption-based celebration of multicultural identities, Lamont and Aksartova find references to universal principles of human nature which 'enable people to resist racism' (2002: 18) as evidence of ordinary cosmopolitanism.

In socio-political research, the idea of cosmopolitan dispositions has had some salience over a longer period of time. Robinson and Zill (1997) have defined cultural cosmopolitanism as an openness to cultural products free of local or national prejudices. They find a strong positive correlation between cosmopolitanism and the level of educational attainment, especially for those who studied social sciences and humanities courses. Further, women scored higher than men, as did black respondents and younger people. Interestingly, cosmopolitans were also found to have a more positive and optimistic outlook and to be more satisfied with their lives generally. In attempting to distinguish between locals and cosmopolitans as political actors, Dye (1963) defined cosmopolitans in terms of having an interest in non-local happenings, taking a non-parochial attitude toward local events and issues, and rejecting 'big city' values. Likewise, Jennings (1966, cited in Robinson et al. 1993) defined cosmopolitanism as an outlook beyond the local, particularly in relation to national and international events. Even earlier, in his study of influence in a small town, Merton (1957) distinguished between locals and cosmopolitans on a similar basis – cosmopolitans were those whose outlook was national rather than local. As Hannerz (1990: 237) points out, such a distinction now seems rather parochial given levels of international integration.

In addition to this, our review of the literature shows that the cosmopolitan attitude is defined by a series of beliefs, attitudes and personal qualities. The notion that there can be 'banal' or 'mundane' versions of the cosmopolitan attitude as well as 'authentic' versions is useful as a preliminary distinction. Billig (1995) has highlighted how forms of banal or vernacular nationalism such as flag waving, singing national anthems, or engaging in ersatz re-enactments of key moments in a nation's history can serve to reinforce collective national sentiments, despite their apparently trivial or inconsequential nature. Urry (2000b) applies this distinction to a discussion of banal globalism in his empirical study of the reception of cosmopolitan media images, and Hebdige (1990) has called attention to how people can be mundane cosmopolitans simply through consuming media images. Thus any measure of cosmopolitan attitudes must differentiate between these mundane or 'unreflexive' forms of cosmopolitanism and authentic or 'reflexive' cosmopolitanism. Indicators of the mundane or unreflexive forms of cosmopolitanism include: the types of food one consumes, consumption of heavily packaged or mediated cultural and tourist experiences, and the unreflexive consumption of ethnic 'styles' in dress or music. In his critique of the class basis of cosmopolitan elites, Calhoun cautions similarly: 'food, tourism, music, literature and clothes are all easy faces of cosmopolitanism, but they are not hard tests for the relationship between local solidarity and international civil society' (Calhoun 2002b: 105). Nava's (1998, 2007) historical account illustrates how cosmopolitan discourses were incorporated into commercial promotions by Selfridges Department store in early twentieth-century London. While Selfridges was 'founded at the height of British Imperialism' it promoted a 'cosmopolitanism which was modern, urban and cultured' (Nava 1998: 166) by its demonstration of intellectual and aesthetic openness through advertising,

store facilities and layout and promotions. While this was a deployment of cosmopolitanism that was related to the growth of modern consumer cultures, representations of luxury and display, and the display of conspicuous signifiers of identity, Nava argues this does not necessarily diminish its critical or transformative efficacy as a cultural text. Indeed, she suggests that the selling of these 'mundane' or 'domesticated' (Nava 2002: 94) forms of cosmopolitan styles goes hand-in-hand with more fundamental and progressive social structural changes. They may, in fact, be the harbingers of wider social changes.

The sociological literature suggests that cosmopolitan attitudes are typically linked to a number of social-structural characteristics. Chaney (2002) has described how shifting aesthetic and cultural economies, coupled with the rising importance of cultural citizenship, have generated the possibility of deploying cosmopolitan symbols as signs of distinction, at least for select groups within a population. He defines the cosmopolitan cultural citizen as having heterogeneous tastes, and the ability to transcend native culture by adopting a learned indifference to local goods (Chaney 2002: 158). Regev (2007a) makes a similar point in relation to what he calls aesthetic cosmopolitanism which emerges at the intersections of global field of art and fields of national culture.

Cosmopolitans are geographically and culturally mobile. As Hall (2002: 26) has recently put it, cosmopolitanism requires the ability to draw upon and enact vocabularies and discourses from a variety of cultural repertoires. The cosmopolitan has the technical and intellectual resources or 'capital' to gain employment across national boundaries, and typically has an ability to traverse, consume, appreciate and empathize with cultural symbols and practices that originate outside their home

country. In this sense, we could think of cosmopolitans as similar to the cultural omnivore identified in recent literature on aesthetic tastes, who has an ability to appreciate and discern rules and repertoires associated with cultural symbols or forms that originate across cultural boundaries (Peterson 1992; Peterson and Kern 1996). These consumers, assumed to be part of a new middle class, have an openness and 'desire to participate in or "sample" other social and cultural worlds' (Wynne and O'Connor 1998: 858). Whether they are best understood as a class, a category, or even 'tribe' of cosmopolitan consumers who actively and conspicuously consume global cultural goods or whether such consumption is merely circumstantial, ordinary or 'unreflexive' is something further empirical research could usefully address (see for example, Edmunds and Turner 2001). Whatever the conclusion, the patterns of consumption of these emerging omnivores suggests affinities between them and what we term 'cosmopolitan consumers'.

It is from Peterson's research on cultural consumption that the groundwork has emerged for an understanding of the emergence of the omnivorous, cosmopolitan consumer. Peterson (1990) asserts that the World Music genre, defined as incorporating music of non-Western origin, is likely to be the preferred music of the affluent baby-boomers, and predicts that it may replace classical music as the music of the intellectual classes into the twenty-first century. Van Eijck (2000: 216) speculates that one attraction of these forms of music 'lies in the musical experiment and the juxtaposition of diverse musical elements'. But more than this, such cosmopolitan omnivorousness becomes a symbol of social status and moral worthiness. More broadly, it is a particular type of cultural capital that demonstrates one is able to appreciate the cultural products and practices of others, suggesting openness and flexibility, which are 'important resources in a society that requires

social and geographical mobility, “employability”, and “social networking” (Van Eijck 2000: 221). Such a credential is an important emergent form of capital, argue Peterson and Kern (1996: 906):

While snobbish exclusion was an effective marker of status in a relatively homogeneous and circumscribed WASP-ish world that could enforce its dominance over all others by force if necessary, omnivorous inclusion seems better adapted to an increasingly global world managed by those who make their way, in part, by showing respect for the cultural expressions of others.

The Sociology of Cosmopolitanism: the Major Themes of the Book

Much of the Chapters that follow concern themselves with a dialogue with the major sociological thinkers about cosmopolitanism; consequently, the reader will find arguments with and appreciations of Nussbaum, Habermas, Beck and Appadurai, among others, and will see what we regard as crucial points of agreement and disagreement. In addition, there are a number of threads that run through this book, which, while they are developed more fully as they are canvassed, are worth bringing together and briefly introducing here. This list can serve as an orientation of our major themes for the reader, as well as a summary of our major claims to make an original contribution to the literature.

First, we wish to situate ourselves within ‘classical sociology’ (Alexander 1989; Calhoun et al 2002; B. Turner 1999, 2006) – the various approaches to sociology

developed by the beginning of the twentieth century and associated with Marx, Weber, Durkheim and Simmel. We wish to reclaim classical sociology as a powerful approach to understanding cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism has often been captured as a subject matter by those by whom classical sociology is seen as irrelevant to today's concerns; consequently, an emphasis on the total reconstruction of social theory for totally new times is the leitmotif of thinkers for whom the classical tradition has outlived its usefulness. Such reconstructive efforts may adopt a relativistic stance to systems of thought, and are often content to engage with cosmopolitanism as a system of ideas, as we discussed above. By contrast, our classical cast of mind suggests to us two protocols. The first is that we regard empirical research as crucial to finding out what cosmopolitanism is; we are not so jaundiced that we regard empirical data with contempt, and consequently some of our own research on cosmopolitan attitudes and practices can be found in Chapter 5. The second classical protocol is that we are quite happy to use 'modernist' sociological theory to make sense of our chosen topic. It has become fashionable to suggest that because the world has changed so much in the last hundred years, it is constantly necessary to invent new theories to make sense of these new times. We regard this claim as exaggerated; the newly industrialized world that impelled Marx, Weber and Durkheim to generate their theories was, we think, a genuine moment of discontinuity with what went before, but we who inhabit the early years of the twenty-first century also still inhabit their world. The wisdom of the classical sociologists is still necessary for our ability to make sense of such social arrangements. As Stephen Turner (2004) argues, much recent sociological theory does not so much reinvent the theoretical terrain as move the furniture around a bit; we grant there is a need for some moving of the furniture to accommodate some new aspects of the modern world, but it is our contention that most of the self-consciously

radical social theory of the last few years does, in the main, two things: it reinvents the wheel, and it makes careers for its inventors. By contrast, in seeing cosmopolitanism as part of the modern world recognizable to the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century sociologists, we think it is possible to use those tried and tested theories that have served sociology well for a hundred years. We shall also 'move the furniture' a little, but we are adamant that there is no need to go to the store to start all over again. Our adherence to classical social theory, then, is a rejection of armchair philosophy (to continue the furniture metaphor) and the embrace of empirical social science, as well as a refusal to accept the hyperbole of massive social change at the expense of studying continuity.

Our second major theme concerns the relationship between cosmopolitanism and the modern nation state. For many cosmopolitan theorists, the nation state is to some extent the term on the 'problem' side of the ledger, while cosmopolitanism offers itself to the 'solution' side. We should say from the start that we recognize the importance of the modern democratic Western nation state, and do not think it would be possible or desirable to get rid of it: it is a utopian belief that post-national entities, such as the European Union, are up to the job *on their own* of maintaining global or local peace. The nation state remains critically important because it invented a way of maintaining peace and order, and it did this in spite of the enormous difficulties that stood – and continue to stand – in its way. These difficulties at one point made it seem unlikely that it would ever be able to generate its secular authority, and wrest away control from religiously dogmatic warring factions. The Treaties of Westphalia of 1648 signalled a moment when the 'necessary compromise' of the nation state could guarantee peace; although the Westphalian

principle of *cuius regio, eius religio* appeared to cement particular confessional practices in particular states, crucially it decoupled religious dissent from citizenship, and by relegating private conviction to the private margins of society, disconnected it from statecraft. This compromise, the deconfessionalization of the Western nation state, is the foundation upon which Western freedom and democracy are built.

However, our enthusiasm for the achievements of the modern democratic Western nation state needs to be finessed. First of all, we see modern cosmopolitanism as not completely contradictory to the nation state and nationalism (cf. Delanty and Rumford 2005: 192; Cheah 1998). We do not believe that cosmopolitanism is a replacement for the nation state; it is, rather, a development of some of the principles of the nation state that must live alongside it. So, to return to the question of the European Union, and the other (mostly still nascent) supra-state entities: while we are enthusiastic about the possibilities for cosmopolitanism that these afford, we recognize that the nation state is still currently the only game in town, and as such will remain the principal governmental mechanism ensuring social peace and social order. Supra-state entities may be built on top of the nation state, but will have to learn to complement the nation state, not replace it.

The nation state can play two possible roles in the development of cosmopolitanism, as it can in the development of the supra-states: it can play an enabling role, or it can play a corrosive role. Broadly, the enabling role is one played by the secular nation state, and the corrosive role is the only one that the confessional or non-democratic state can play. We make this distinction because it is only secular states that can truly

achieve the sort of moral universalism combined with toleration of difference that is both the ground for cosmopolitanism and the structure of civil society which cosmopolitanism can extend. Only a state which understands its role as a *governmental mechanism*, rather than as having claims to particular truths, is likely to be able to play the enabling role that cosmopolitanism needs. To give a concrete example, Islamic states will always struggle to be characterized as cosmopolitan. First of all, when they look outward towards other states, their approach is not to appreciate the other, but understand it as that which must be kept separate, subsumed or destroyed. A corollary of this is that the internal affairs of Islamic states are also uncosmopolitan, because of the way in which difference is coded as and subsequently enacted through inequality (and here we gesture towards the position of women and the widespread use of slavery – for example, in Sudan and Mauritania – in Islamic societies). Furthermore, one can look with some concern at the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights, conceived as a kind of competitor to the United Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights: the former document privileges the *shari’ah* as a legitimate limit to human rights, which of course means that rights can be secondary to religious orthodoxy and thus erased by it. And of course, one must make the same point about those totalitarian states, such as North Korea or the former Soviet Union, which view themselves in quasi-confessional terms as privileged centres of truth.

By contrast, the secular states, which have given up the idea of a divinely guaranteed *raison d’être* (whether the ‘divinity’ is Christ, Mohammed, Stalin or Kim Il-sung), become less concerned with the boundaries between themselves and others, and become receptive to experiences of otherness. Of course, increasing secularity is no

guarantee of this process; Durkheim (1992: 72-3), for example, was horrified by the growth of secular patriotism in his lifetime, which he saw as a threat to global brotherhood. Nationalism is often dangerous and corrosive to the idea of embracing the other; nationalistic sentiments may lead to what social identity theorists like Henri Tajfel (e.g. 1981) have described as in-group/out-group behaviour, where strong identification with the national group leads to antipathy towards those of other nations. While, then, we are not arguing that secular nation states are sufficient conditions of the cosmopolitan cast of mind, they are in all probability necessary conditions: it is only in such conditions that the ironic self can flourish, and the average citizen, disembedded from 'hot' loyalties, can begin to look outward and see the value of engaging with otherness.

Our third major theme is a concerted effort to reject relativistic modes of thinking when it comes to cosmopolitanism. It is not unusual to see social theory anxious about value judgements, and to move, implicitly or explicitly, to an intellectual terrain where all ideas, cultures, and forms of social life are of equal moral value. However, if all cultures are equal in value, then cosmopolitanism will collapse, because there is nothing any one culture can learn (or have any interest in learning) from another. Bryan Turner (2006) talks of a 'critical recognition ethics' – inspired by Max Weber's work – which can guide a process of cosmopolitanization. In essence, critical recognition ethics amounts to a strong commitment to the work of understanding the other, but it does not shy away from making a judgement of the practices of the other (so, for example, a critical recognition ethics would have no squeamishness in condemning the Taliban destruction of Hindu icons in Afghanistan). Our cosmopolitanism, then, is a kind of *Verstehen* sociology – a

serious attempt to understand what the other understands — which does not shy away from the idea of cosmopolitanism as necessarily connected to universalist principles such as freedom of speech, human rights, and so forth, and which must then be viewed as a decidedly *ethical* approach. However, we should not attempt to defend this universalism in terms of a Kantian, rationalistic, Enlightenment position, but rather in terms of a Hobbesian understanding that certain sorts of agreements have to be negotiated, and certain rights and practices given up, if cosmopolitanism is to work. If there are any new stirrings in the intellectual terrain of social theory and in our political consciousness, perhaps it is in the gradual acceptance that ‘giving up rights and practices’ is not necessarily a loss of freedom, but may be required to guarantee the survival of self and other, and to guarantee freedom. So, for example, the growth of a global comprehension of the problem of climate change has become accompanied by an understanding that what may have previously been seen as a series of rights (to travel and to consume without limit) is in fact more clearly seen as a series of responsibilities to the other and to the ecosystem; it therefore may be that giving up apparent freedoms is required for the continued health of self, other and the planet. We see cosmopolitanism as a negotiated settlement, but a settlement invested with values.

This leads to a fourth point. It is our contention that the various flowerings of cosmopolitanism throughout history — and here we think of the milieux surrounding Diogenes and Kant, as well as the period after the fall of the Berlin Wall — have been rare, and require an unusual set of historical conjunctures. The in-group/out-group attitude is our default social identity. However, we are now at a historical moment where cosmopolitanism is not a choice, but is forced upon us. The global nature of

some aspects of our society – especially global risk – means that phenomena like climate change force us into dialogue with others, and force us to understand that our sense of solidarity and belonging is now compelled to be global rather than local. It would certainly be a mistake to imagine that this global interconnection is a purely modern phenomenon, and that the premodern world was a collection of homogeneous cultures which were never mixed. It is not difficult to dispute this myth: one good example is Jack Goody's (2004) work on the constant cultural exchanges between Europe and the Islamic world from at least the eighth century. To this extent, then, cosmopolitanism is not exactly a new problem, since all cultures have always had to deal with the other. But today, our ability to ignore the other is rapidly diminishing. We are becoming cosmopolitan whether we choose to or not.

Our fifth point of emphasis is on the notion of cosmopolitanism as a global exchange relationship. As Bryan Turner (2006) points out, a recurring idea in the sociology of Durkheim, Simmel and Parsons was the emphasis on 'the social' as defined by social exchange (and for both Simmel and Parsons, money is a key exchange mechanism). Turner goes on to suggest that while money may be the major mechanism of exchange in the economic subsystem of society, trust is the mechanism of exchange in the social subsystem. Whether or not one agrees with this emphasis on trust, it is clear to us that Turner has hit upon something important in seeing exchange as fundamental to the social; our development of this idea leads to our emphasis on cosmopolitanism as an exchange relationship in a global social context.

Our sixth theme concerns the emphasis we place on material culture in our theorization of cosmopolitanism. It has become common in sociology to emphasize the role of objects and other nonhumans in the construction of networks in which human social life is but one element. For us, cosmopolitanism can never simply be understood as a mental phenomenon; it is a description of a network in which humans and nonhumans are aligned in such a way as to produce behavioural repertoires recognizable as cosmopolitan.