Flight Crew Callouts and Aircraft Automation Modes An Observational Study of Task Shedding

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Abstract

New aircraft come with a set of recommended standard operating procedures, in the case of multi-crew aircraft this includes "callouts"—verbalizations of particular flight guidance automation mode changes. In an attempt to reduce the risk for mode confusion some operators have required flight crews to callout all flight quidance automation mode changes as a means of forcing pilots to monitor the Flight Mode Annunciator (FMA). Previous research has shown that crews do not spend enough time on the flight mode annunciator, and skip mode call-outs as well as making call-outs in advance of annunciations: there has been no report of any system or regularity in the shedding and adaptation of callouts. One reason could be the contrived empirical simulator settings of such research, which we aimed to augment with natural observations of real cockpit work reported here. With the hope of answering, in more detail, how required verbal coordination of annunciated mode changes gets adapted to real settings we observed 19 line flights with three different airlines from the first observer's seat in the cockpit. We found that many callouts were simply shed in high-workload situations, and found regularity in the kind of callouts being shed. Callouts relating to aircraft automation, such as FMA call-outs, were shed before other required callouts. Our results suggested that FMA callouts were not used as a tool to detect or remember automation mode changes but as a vehicle for coordinating between the pilots themselves, a finding that could serve as a reminder for future design of callout procedures.

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Introduction

The aviation industry considers Standard Operating Procedures (SOP's) the backbone of safe operations (JAA 1997, ICAO 2001) and flight crew verbal "callouts" form a part of these recommended standard operating procedures (Airbus Industrie, 2006, Boeing Commercial Aeroplanes, 1999). "Call-outs" are what one crewmember has to say to the other(s) in a particular operational situation and are intended to ensure effective crew communication, promote situational awareness, and ensure crew understanding of systems and their use (Airbus Industrie, 2006). In an attempt to reduce the risk for mode confusion (see e.g. Sarter & Woods, 1997) some aircraft manufacturers have required flight crews to callout all flight guidance automation mode changes as a means to force pilots into monitoring the flight mode annunciator. The underlying strategy is that there is a need for pilots to know the actual flight guidance mode at all times and that by requiring all mode changes be called out, the pilots will spend more time on the flight mode annunciator (FMA) and, presumably, their mode awareness will increase (Airbus Industrie, n.d.).

Though pilots need to know the flight guidance mode at all times, they do not dwell much on the flight mode annunciator. The average cumulative dwell time on the flight mode annunciator is as low as 2.9% of the time (Hüettig & Anders. 1999). In addition to the low dwell time, detection rate for unexpected mode changes is low—in the best cases 60% (Mumaw, Sarter & Wickens, 2001). Unexpected mode changes have been implicated in accidents with automated aircraft (e.g. FAA, 1996; Sarter & Woods, 1997), which raises questions about pilots' abilities to keep track of automation. Does this assumption work in the operational reality? Previous research confirmed how pilots (as do other operators) adapt the application of procedures to practical task demands (Snook, 2000; Dekker, 2003) and this applies to mode callouts too (Degani & Wiener, 1994; Huettig, Anders & Tautz, 1999; Plat & Amalberti, 2000; Mumaw et al., 2001; Björklund, Alfredsson & Dekker, 2006). Yet the latter work revealed little regularity in which callouts are adapted, or how; therefore, it has limited leverage over how to potentially intervene—procedurally or through design—to improve mode awareness. One reason for this limitation could be that this work has mostly been carried out in simulated settings, studying the eye movements or other parameters of a single pilot in the studied flight crews (Björklund et al., 2006 being an exception to the latter). Recent applications of discourse analysis in aviation human factors (e.g., Nevile, 2004) encouraged the study of talk-in-interaction in natural settings, in order to go beyond stylized, partial, or static descriptions of the work as it occurs naturally with two pilots jointly having to monitor and make sense of the behavior of their automation. The notion of talk-in-interaction deliberately suggests "talk is not all participants do as they interact" (Nevile, 2004, p. 21), which leaves analytic room for other resources to be drawn on (e.g., the FMA, pointing) as participants in the work jointly form meaning around the setting they interact in. The purpose of this paper is to report on an effort to augment current knowledge on mode monitoring with such a talk-in-interaction study. We hope to answer, in more detail, how verbal coordination of annunciated mode changes gets adapted in real settings.

As with previous research on unexpected mode changes (Sarter & Woods, 1997), the majority of the observed flights in this study were performed on the A320 family aircraft. We use the Airbus Industrie's term Flight Management Guidance System (FMGS) to denote the whole flight guidance system. The FMGS hardware artefacts visible to the pilots are the Flight Mode Annunciator (FMA), the Flight Control Unit (FCU) and the Multipurpose Control and Display Unit (MCDU).



Figure 1. The Flightdeck of A320 with the FCU on the glare shield and the Primary Flight Display with the FMA above the artificial horizon. The left pilot's Primary Flight Display is magnified to show the FMA.

The purpose of the FMGS is to aid the pilot in achieving the objectives of flying the aircraft safely and efficiently from takeoff up to and including landing and freeing the pilots from hand flying the aircraft. The FMGS is capable of automatically changing flight guidance modes as it becomes necessary for the flight guidance system to follow the pre-planned flight plan. The pilot can also select modes and target values through the Flight Control Unit mounted on the glare

shield panel in front of him or her. Aircraft produced after 1980 typically display the active and armed automatic flight guidance modes on a Flight Mode Annunciator (FMA). The FMA is situated on top of the primary flight display, just above the artificial horizon. See Figure 1. The horizon is the "anchor" of the pilots' instruments—enjoying an average dwell time of 40% of total scanning (Anders, 2001; Mumaw, Sarter & Wickens, 2001). Flight guidance mode status is shown on the FMA as contractions of the mode name in capitals, e.g. "HDG" for "heading select" mode and "CLB" for "climb" mode. Upon a mode change, a frame is shown around the annunciation for 10 seconds.

The viewing angle from the design pilot eye point between the centre of the artificial horizon and the FMA is approximately nine degrees. As this is more than the three degrees angle of focal vision, FMA monitoring must rely on deliberate scanning strategies, and indeed, on cockpit coordinative work other than mere looking. Such action includes the verbal announcements of mode changes, or pointing or nodding to various displays that represent something of apparent interest. Awareness of mode status then, is (or should be) collaboratively produced drawing on multiple sources. This activity, however, is itself embedded in an environment with many concurrent task demands, where it is unlikely that procedures can always be completed from top to bottom or applied linearly, and where pilots do not possess full control over their execution (Loukopoulos, Dismukes, & Barshi, 2003). Naturally occurring ebbs and flows in task load mean that some procedures or tasks will be deferred, interleaved, or shed altogether, and mode callouts are no exception. The questions for the research in this paper included: what mode callouts are typically shed? Are there particular phases of flight more vulnerable to callout shedding? Does callout shedding vary with pilot experience on type?

Method

The Participants

We were able to study how crews worked to coordinate their actions with the flight guidance system on three European air carriers flying the Airbus A320 series aircraft. The flights were randomly selected from each operator's time table and the commander of the selected flight was contacted before the flight to obtain the pilots' consent.

The Operational Environment

All flights were performed in Europe in an area of medium to high traffic density. The supporting navigation and air traffic control infrastructure were of high quality. No extreme weather phenomena except cold weather operations with icing and contamination on runways interfered with the operations.

The Observations

Three European air operators were followed over a period of two months. One of the authors acted as observer. The observer was a subject matter expert intimately familiar with the A320 family aircraft and its flight guidance systems (with no active role in the A320 fleet of that airline). He was an active pilot with 6000 hours experience from commercial jet operations, holding a valid B737-NG type certificate. He also had experience from aircraft evaluation and specification work for an airline, including A320, A330, and A340 aircraft specifications. During the flight, the observations targeted flight guidance mode annunciations, perceived task load, and flight crew callouts. High taskload periods in this study were defined as periods when the observer judged the pilots to be so occupied by their present task that it prevented them from performing additional tasks. The observations were noted by hand by the observer seated in the first cockpit observer seat and later processed for analysis. A total of 19 flights on the A320 were observed.

Participating Operators and Callout Procedures

Prescribed callout procedures differed between the three participating airlines. Operator A required the pilots to callout all FMA changes as they occurred. Operator B required no flight guidance automation callouts at all, whereas operator C required a subset of mode changes to be called out by the pilot flying. This subset included all verified selections (made by the pilots themselves) in addition to modes that altered the level of aircraft automation (for example from a more strategic navigation (NAV) mode to a more tactical heading select (HDG SEL) mode).

Justification for these different callout philosophies was different. Operator A wanted to force their pilots to know and monitor the FMA at all times, while operator B emphasized the importance of raw data showing the actual progress of the aircraft. Operator C justified requiring the callout of only a subset of annunciated modes because it wanted crews to anticipate what the flight guidance automation would do in the near future (see also Sarter & Woods, 1997).

A Normal Flight

For purposes of analysis, a normal baseline flight can be used to lay out the numbers and kinds of mode changes that can be expected. A flight can be divided into various flight phases: Preflight, Takeoff, Climb, Cruise, Descend, Approach, and Landing. A typical line flight can be expected to follow this normal phase progression, a fact utilized by the flight guidance system to set different target speeds for different phases of flight. Such a normal phase progression will also lead to a predictable pattern of flight guidance system mode transitions during the flight.




Figure 2. Flight phases of a normal flight in the A320 family aircraft

In Figure 2, we have plotted a non-complicated normal flight. The normal flight actually differs in typical ways from the canonical one predicted by the manufacturer (and on which the flight guidance system logic as well as much training is predicated). The greatest difference is in the use of lower-automation tactical modes (e.g. heading select) in the climb and approach phases in response to air traffic control clearances. Shifts to tactical lateral modes entail automatic shifts in vertical mode. At each flight phase shift, there are a number of typical mode transitions. In addition, there are also some mode transitions typically occurring within the flight phase. In addition, coupled to the vertical mode transitions, there are also a number of mode transitions of the autothrust system. In Table 1, we have listed the number of mode transitions that typically would occur during the normal flight.

Table 1 Mode Transitions

Flight Phase	Typical flight guidance modes for a normal flight			
Flight Phase	Autothrust	Vertical	Lateral	
Preflight	blank	blank	blank	
Takeoff	MAN FLX	SRS	RWY	
Takeoff	MAN FLX	SRS	NAV	
Climb	THR CLB	CLB	NAV	
Climb	THR CLB	OP CLB	HDG	
Cruise	SPEED	ALT*	NAV	
Cruise	SPEED	ALT	NAV	
Cruise	SPEED	ALT CRZ	NAV	
Descend	THR IDLE	DES	NAV	
Descend	THR IDLE	OP DES	HDG	
Descend	SPEED	ALT*	HDG	
Descend	SPEED	ALT	HDG	
Descend	THR IDLE	OP DES	HDG	
Descend	SPEED	ALT*	HDG	
Descend	SPEED	ALT	HDG	
Approach	SPEED	ALT	LOC*	
Approach	SPEED	ALT	LOC	
Approach	SPEED	G/S*	LOC	
Approach	SPEED	G/S	LOC	
Approach	SPEED	LAND	LAND	
Approach	blank	ROLLOUT	ROLLOUT	
Sum of mode changes	7	17	9	

Depending on the nature of the operational area, the total number of mode transitions occurring over the normal flight may differ. We assumed an uncomplicated flight in a radar environment, including radar vectors for final approach, between two normal, large European airports.

Applying these mode changes to the normal flight flown by the three operators with their different procedures, we expected around 33 flight guidance callouts for operator A, zero for operator B and 14 callouts for operator C.

Results

The data set consisted of 19 flights on the A320 family aircraft with three independent air operators. During these 19 flights, we observed a total number of 589 annunciated mode changes. The majority of the observed flights were with operator C for logistical reasons. See Table 2 for a compilation of the data set.

Table 2 Data Set for Mode Changes

	Operator A	Operator B	Operator C	All
Flights	2	2	15	19
Mode changes	69	56	464	589
Average	34	28	31	31
Median	34	28	32	30

The average number of mode transitions per flight was 31, with the majority (21) occurring during descent and approach phases, see Figure 3 for the average distribution of mode changes during the flight. The median number of mode changes per A320 flight of the study was 30. Of the 589 mode changes 141 were autothrust changes, 307 vertical mode changes and 141 lateral mode changes.




Figure 3. Average number of mode changes per flight phase

Mode Callouts

The average number of mode callouts per flight was over 26 or conversely, 4.6 callouts (15%) per flight were shed. From a total of 87 observed shed callouts. 51 were vertical mode callouts, 27 were lateral mode callouts and 9 were autothrust mode callouts, giving a shedding rate of 17% for vertical mode callouts, 19% for lateral mode callouts and 6% for autothrust mode callouts (see Figure 4).




Figure 4. Shed mode callouts per flight guidance axis

There was no significant difference between callout shedding for autopilot vertical and lateral modes, whereas a comparison between autothrust and autopilot mode callouts showed difference in callout shedding, X^2 (df = 1) = 10.36, p < .01. All callouts, that were called at all, were called out in the prescribed language and form. We noted no improvisations. Callouts that were shed were not recalled or saved for later verbal announcement.




Figure 5. Average number of mode changes and callout shedding per operator

We observed a total of 69 mode changes with operator A, where 22 mode callouts (32%) were shed. We observed 464 mode changes with Operator C, where 65 mode callouts (14%) were shed, see Figure 5. We have cast the figures for operators A and C in a contingency in Table 3 excluding operator B from the comparison as it did not require any mode callouts at all. The differences were significant X2 (df = 1) = $14.05 \, p < .001$.

Table 3 Operator A and Operator C Comparison

	Operator A	Operator C	Combined
Mode changes called out	47 (57,7)	399 (388,3)	446
Mode changes not called	22 (11,3)	65 (75,7)	87
Total	69	464	533

In addition to the mode callouts required by procedures, we observed 39 nonrequired mode callouts at operator B (3) and C (36), and none at operator A. Twenty-three of those callouts were related to the autothrust going to IDLE mode as a consequences of the pilot selecting a descend autopilot mode (mostly in response to air traffic control clearances that required a deviation from the preprogrammed flight path). At operator B, two of the non-required mode callouts were the pilot calling out "Open Climb" mode, which came as a so-called reversion mode when the pilot selected the heading mode on the flight control unit.

Effect of Pilot Experience on Type

The participants had a total average flying experience of 9100 hrs, with an average of 510 hours on the A320 series. The lowest number of hours on the A320 series aircraft of the participants was 10, the highest 5000. The pilot flying had less than 300 hours experience on the Airbus family aircraft in 11 of the 19 observed flights. Those relatively inexperienced Airbus pilots omitted 31 of the totally 87 observed omitted callouts emanating from 589 mode changes. There were no significant differences between the groups, χ^2 (df = 1) = 0.285, p > .59.

Effect of Flight Phase and Task Load

Mode callout shedding varied between 25% in climb and 11% during approach. see Figure 6.

Collapsing data over flight phase into two groups, one early part and one later part of the flight shows a significant difference between Takeoff to Cruise, versus the Descend and Approach phases, χ^2 (df =1) = 10,33, p < .005. The data are presented in Table 4.




Figure 6. Flight guidance mode changes and callout shedding per flight phase

Table 4 Flight Phase Data

Flight phase	TKOF	CLIMB	CRUISE	DES	APCH	Combined
Mode changes called out	61 (<i>64.8</i>)	57 (64.8)	31 (32.4)	168 (161.9)	185 (178.1)	502
Mode changes not called	15 <i>(11.2)</i>	19 (11.2)	7 (5.6)	22 (28.1)	24 (30.9)	87
Total	76	76	38	190	209	589

During periods when the observer assessed crew task load to be close to saturation the pilots omit calling out 21 out of 40 (53%) of the occurring mode changes. In lower task load situations the shedding rate was 12% (see Figure 7).




Figure 7: Percentage shed calls in a saturated versus unsaturated task load situation

In Table 5, we have cast the data in a contingency according to task load. Testing for significance with the γ 2-test showed a significant difference between the groups, χ^2 (df = 1) = 44.64 p < .001.

Table 5 Task Load

	Unsaturated	Saturated	Combined
Shed callouts	66 (81.1)	21 (5.9)	87
Called mode changes	483 (467.9)	19 (34.1)	502
Total	549	40	589

Discussion

More stringent callout procedures appear to correlate to less compliance, as evidenced by Operator A's 68% callout rate versus Operator C's 86% (against an average over all three operators of 85%). The up-front investment made by Operator C to think critically through which mode callouts are really important, and realistically can be expected to be followed, appears to generate a return in greater compliance. It is interesting to note that pilot experience with the A320 family aircraft seems to have no significant impact on the callout rate. While high task load does have a significant effect on callout shedding, it does not appear to be connected as clearly with phases of flight that are traditionally thought of as higher in task load (particularly descent and approach). In fact, descent and approach phases were associated with a lower callout shedding than takeoff and climb. The explanation of this apparent paradox may be an effect of the way task saturation was defined in this study. Task load in this study was estimated by a domain expert, well aware of normal task load during the various phases of flight. Higher task load situations may thus appear in other phases of flight than traditionally associated with high workload. Interestingly during high task load, other verbal coordination, especially that with Air Traffic Control, do not suffer. Mode callouts about the automation could be (and perhaps are) seen as a secondary task, while verbal coordination with, or about, other human partners in the system (e.g. the controller) are deemed central, or primary to the conduct of the flight.

There appears to be a floor effect with mode callouts: even at operator B (which required no mode callouts to be made on the A320 whatsoever) some mode changes are called out. These, interestingly, were callouts associated with vertical mode reversions that are connected to pilot changes in the lateral plan. The callouts thus made could be evidence of automation surprises, where the mode change is not directly attributable to a pilot action but rather a designed-in side effect that may come as unexpected to the crew (see Sarter & Woods, 1997). The floor effect is visible also at operator C (despite its critical up-front selection of which modes to call out); more modes get called out than what procedures specify.

Design assumptions of a flight manifested in the vertical flightplan with different phases of flight and switching conditions are regularly contested by the fact that during all observed flights of the A320 the pilots had to force the FMGS into the approach phase. In no flight did the pilots use the DES mode that lets the FMGS control the target descend speed and altitude constraints. When asked, the pilots stated that the uncertainty of the air traffic control intention while being radar vectored for final approach precluded the use of this high-level automation mode. They preferred to use the lower level automation OP DES mode, where the pilot controlled the descent constraints and the descent path more directly.

The normal flight in this study included both vectoring during the climbout, with subsequent reversions to the OP CLB mode. Also it contained several altitude level-offs during descent with speed restrictions and radar vectoring to position the aircraft in the approach sequence, again leading to reversionary mode changes from DES mode to OP DES mode. As discussed in the section above, this led the pilots to prefer to manage the flight in lower levels of automation than

the modes associated with the pre-planned (and most certainly not followed) vertical and lateral flightplan. It is interesting to note that the manufacturers assumed normal flight as it appeared in the flightcrew manuals, see Figure 8, contained an assumption of only 22 mode changes in a succession that was not observed in this study.




Figure 8. The assumed normal flight with typical flight guidance modes as shown in the Flight Crew Operating Manual

The study did not lead to conclusive claims about the relationship between callout shedding and flight crew performance. However, no automation surprises (see Sarter & Woods, 1997) were observed; whether mode changes were called out or not, did not seem to have a large effect on the potential for coordination breakdowns in the situations observed in this study.

Conclusions

The study reported here showed that on the Airbus A320 around 15% of required flight guidance automation mode change callouts are shed. There wasstrong influence of the number of required callouts on compliance. The more an airline company required its pilots to call out, the more callouts they will shed. Even if an airline does not require any mode callouts whatsoever, crews do call out some mode changes. These are the (unexpected) reversionary mode changes (such as open climb, or OP CLB) that were called out even if the operator did not require. This suggested a floor effect: some mode changes are so salient relative to crew expectations that they will provoke a callout independent of procedural imperative.

When modes were called out, pilots invariably used the correct verbiage; there was no improvisation. When callouts were shed, the crews studied here never revisited them (which, in contrast, they did do with briefings and checklists and other interrupted or uncompleted cockpit tasks). The study also showed a strong effect of task load on mode callout shedding, suggesting that mode callouts are seen as a secondary task relative to other aggregating priorities (e.g. verbal coordination with ATC is not shed in the same way, even during high task load situations). The study could not show any detectable effect of aircraft experience, suggesting that shedding of callouts is relatively stable across a pilot's

familiarity with the equipment, and that compliance with mode callouts hinges on factors other than experience.

This study could help operators become more sensitive to which mode callouts crews consider important given their operational context, and which mode changes crews can realistically be expected to call out. Cockpit procedure designers should note that FMA callouts are likely to be shed in exactly the situations where they were thought to be needed most. Cockpit procedures that capitalize on redundant sources to keep the pilots' aware of the state of the aircraft's automation such as briefings may thus add resilience to the autopilot-pilots triad. Training pilots to transition effortlessly between levels of automation is another possible tool for operators to ensure that pilot's keep track of automation behavior. In the end, indeed, the FMA is probably an unsatisfying solution to ensuring crew awareness of automation status. Even such awareness of state (itself often incomplete and buggy, as has been pointed out previously [e.g. Sarter & Woods, 1997] and confirmed again here), does not necessarily enhance an understanding of automation behavior, which is, of course, the target for designers to get across and for crews to comprehend.

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