What sort of minded being has language? Anticipatory dynamics, arguability and agency in a normatively and recursively self-transforming learning system Part 1

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Title What sort of minded being has language? Anticipatory dynamics, arguability and agency in a normatively and recursively self-transforming learning system Part 1
Author Thibault, Paul John
Journal Name Linguistics and the Human Sciences
Year Published 2005
Place of publication United Kingdom
Publisher Equinox Publishing Ltd
Abstract Theories of cognition that are based on information processing and representation are reactive (Rosen, 1985) or backwards looking, not anticipatory. In a previous article (Thibault, 2005a), I looked at the reasons why humans and bonobos do not need an innate language faculty in order to be minded, languaging beings. The present article takes up some of the questions explored there, but, it asks, on the other hand, what sort of a minded agent has language and what kind of account of language and more broadly meaning do we need to explain minded, languaged agents and the activities they participate in? Following Rosen (1985), I also take up and further develop a point first raised in Thibault (2004a: 187) on language as an anticipatory system, rather than a reactively 'representational' one (see also Bickhard, 2005).
Peer Reviewed Yes
Published Yes
Volume 1
Issue Number 2
Page from 261
Page to 335
ISSN 1742-2906
Date Accessioned 2007-08-08
Language en_AU
Faculty Faculty of Education
Subject PRE2009-Other Language and Culture
URI http://hdl.handle.net/10072/16711
Publication Type Journal Articles (Refereed Article)
Publication Type Code c1x

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